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NOTE 
Ultra Vires Takings 
Matthew D. Zinn 
INrn.ODUCTION 
When does legislative or administrative regulatory action "go[] 
too far" and effectively amount to an .appropriation of private prop­
erty for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation?1 
This question has turned out to be one of the thorniest in American 
constitutional law.2 The Supreme Court has identified several cir­
cumstances in which one can expect to find a regulatory taking,3 but 
its numerous pronouncements on the subject give no clear rule to 
distinguish compensable takings from noncompensable interference 
with property rights. 
Notwithstanding its volume, the commentary on the Takings 
Clause by and large addresses only proper governmental action that 
rises to the level of a taking. Commentators have bypassed the 
question of what the Clause demands of regulatory restrictions that 
suffer from other legal flaws, such as being without statutory au­
thority or being arbitrary and capricious. This Note suggests there 
are compelling reasons that one such flaw - the action's being un­
authorized, or ultra vires4 - should be fatal to takings claims di-
1. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
2. Co=entators have advanced several theories to explain the complexity of takings 
Jaw, many of which posit that the Takings Clause embodies fundamental conflicts endemic to 
liberal-democratic governance. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
nm CONSTITUTION 116-18 (1977); Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1600, 1628 (1988); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a 
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 593-94 (1984), cited in Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 
1077, 1095-96 (1993). 
3. The Court has identified three circumstances in which a court may find a regulatory 
taking: (1) physical occupation of property, see, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); (2) deprivation of all "economically beneficial or 
productive use" of property, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 
(1992); and (3) satisfaction of a multi-factor, "essentially ad-hoc, factual inquir[y]" concern­
ing the "character" of the governmental action, its economic impact on the property owner, 
and its interference with "distinct investment-backed expectations," Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
4. Traditionally associated with the law of corporations, see, e.g., Ashbury Ry. Carriage & 
Iron Co. v. Riche, 7 L.R.-E. & I. App. 653 (Eng. 1875), the term "ultra vires" is here used to 
describe those agency actions that Jack statutory basis. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 
(6th ed. 1990). 
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rected against state governments. Whether these particular takings 
must be compensated remains to be determined conclusively. 
This issue may be presented in several procedural postures. A 
property owner might bring both a takings claim and an administra­
tive law claim complaining that the regulation is ultra vires. The 
court might then enjoin the regulatory action on the latter basis,5 
converting what would have been a permanent taking into a tempo­
rary taking.6 The issue also arises when a court has enjoined the 
regulation in a previous action and a property owner later seeks just 
compensation for the duration of the enjoined action.7 In any 
event, because courts enjoin unauthorized actions, such flawed reg­
ulations can, at most, amount to temporary takings.8 
Consider the following example.9 A state agency requires that a 
property owner obtain a permit to develop her property. The 
agency denies the owner the permit, leaving the owner with no eco­
nomic use of the property. The owner sues the agency, claiming 
that the agency lacked statutory authority to demand that the 
owner obtain the permit in the first instance and also that the denial 
effected a taking of the property. After severing the claims for trial, 
the court decides that the agency altogether lacked authority to reg-
This Note does not address the nominally similar situation in which the legislature has not 
delegated to the agency the power of eminent domain. Courts have noted on several occa­
sions the distinction between authority to condemn property formally and authority to per­
form the act alleged to be a taking. See, e.g., Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United 
States, 260 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1922), cited in Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 
F.2d 893, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In Portsmouth Harbor, Justice Holmes argued that the proper 
question of authority was not, as Justice Brandeis asserted in his dissent, whether the defend­
ant agency had the power to condemn property, but rather whether the action challenged as 
a taking was itself authorized by statute. See 260 U.S. at 330; cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 n.19 (1984) (considering authority for the challenged regulation, not 
authority to condemn). Were it otherwise, the legislature could immunize agencies against 
takings claims simply by withholding the eminent domain power. See Tahoe-Sierra Preserva­
tion Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg!. Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331, 1341 (9th Cir. 1990). 
5. A court will enjoin an agency action that lacks statutory authority. See Federal Ad­
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1996) (requiring a reviewing federal court 
to "hold unlawful and set aside" an action "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right"). Many states have adopted similar provisions. See 
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr § 5-116 (1981), 15 U.L.A. 1, 127 (1990); 
Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REv. 297, 
297 (1986) (noting that most states' administrative procedure statutes are based on the Model 
Act). 
6. See, e.g., Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commn., 953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998). 
7. See, e.g., Com v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 586 (11th Cir. 1990); Marks v. 
United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 387, 410-11 (1995); Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge, 604 N.E.2d 
1269, 1271-72 (Mass. 1992). 
8. Temporary regulatory takings have been compensable since the Supreme Court's deci­
sion in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 
(1987). Temporary physical expropriation of property has a much longer history of compen­
sability. See United States v. Peewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 119-21 (1951) (Reed, J., concur­
ring) (collecting cases). This Note generally contemplates only regulatory takings, although 
many of the principles discussed will apply as readily to physical expropriation. 
9. This example is based generally on the facts of Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1188. 
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ulate the property, and it mandates that the agency not stand in the 
way of the development. In so doing, the court transforms the 
plaintiff's permanent takings claim into a temporary takings claim 
because the owner may now proceed with her intended use of the 
property. Must the court now award just compensation for the eco­
nomic loss suffered while the regulation was in effect? 
Courts have not conclusively decided whether state and local 
governments must pay just compensation under the Takings Clause 
for agency actions that are invalidated by a court as ultra vires.10 
These cases might be adequately addressed under the normal tests 
for regulatory takings; that is, ultra vires takings might be compen­
sable like any other action that meets the courts' definition of "tak­
ing." Indeed, several courts have approved such claims against 
state agencies with little or no attention given to the' fact that the 
action was ultra vires.11 To the contrary, however, the courts that 
most frequently exercise jurisdiction over claims brought against 
the federal government - the Court of Federal Claims12 and its 
predecessors,13 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,14 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court15 - have almost unanimously held that unauthor­
ized federal agency actions cannot give rise to takings liability.16 A 
10. The Takings Clause was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 
U.S. 226 (1897). 
11. See Com, 904 F.2d at 587 (allowing consideration of a takings claim where the rele­
vant ordinance had been invalidated as unauthorized); Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta 
Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that "[i]f official au­
thorities act on behalf of the state so as to take private property for public use without just 
compensation, even if they are acting outside of the scope of their official powers, they have 
violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments"); Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal 
Commn., 52 Cal. App. 4th 784, 791, 795 (1997) (finding taking despite invalidation of chal­
lenged action in prior proceeding), revd. on other grounds, 953 P.2d 1188 (1998); Steinbergh, 
604 N.E.2d at 1272-73 (performing takings analysis where challenged action had been invali­
dated in prior case; rejecting takings claim on other grounds). 
12. The Tucker Act gives the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over claims "founded 
... upon the Constitution" brought against the federal government. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(l). 
The district courts also hear takings claims brought against the federal government, but their 
concurrent jurisdiction is limited to claims of $10,000 or less. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) 
(1994). 
13. The Court of Federal Claims has existed in two previous forms, the Court of Claims, 
see Act of February 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, and the Claims Court, see Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 139, 96 Stat. 25, 42, and received its current 
name in 1992, see Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 
Stat. 4506, 4516. 
14. Appeals from the Court of Federal Claims are heard solely by the Federal Circuit. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1994). Appeal of a takings claim heard by a district court under 
its limited concurrent jurisdiction is taken to the court of appeals of the circuit in which the 
district court sits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1994). 
15. The Court has not spoken directly to the issue of takings claims against state agencies 
for ultra vires actions, although this Note argues that the principles elaborated by the Court 
apply as readily to state claims as to federal claims. See infra Part I. 
16. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 127 
n.16 (1974); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 330 (1922); 
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handful of courts have similarly rejected ultra vires takings claims 
leveled at state agencies expressly because the implementing 
agency lacked authority.17 Both the federal and state cases re­
jecting ultra vires takings claims are notable for their myriad ratio­
nales18 and for their often perfunctory discussion of those 
rationales.19 
Reading the literature on the Takings Clause, one might think 
that once an action has been characterized as a taking - for in­
stance, because it deprived a property owner of all economically 
beneficial use of her property - the court's liability inquiry is fin­
ished and all that remains to be decided is the amount of compensa­
tion due. On the contrary, that a "taking" has occurred is only one 
of the Clause's demands. For instance, the taking must have been 
of "private property," and the parties might dispute whether the 
interest taken was in fact within the plaintiff's "bundle."20 Simi­
larly, the action must be that of the government and it must serve a 
"public use." In short, under the plain language of the Takings 
United States v. North Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333 (1920); Hughes v. 
United States, 230 U.S. 24, 35 (1913); Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1910); 
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 479 (1903) (Brown, J., concurring). 
Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Del-Rio Drilling Programs Inc. v. United States, No. 97-5055, 
1998 WL 321272, at *4 (Fed. Cir. June 18, 1998); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 
796, 802-03 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 899 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986); Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1572 {Fed. Cir. 1985). 
Court of Federal Claims. See, e.g., Heck v. United States, 37 Fed. CI. 245, 253-56 (1997); 
Marks v. United States, 34 Fed. CI. 387, 409-10 {1995); Adams v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 
132, 137 {1990); NL Indus., Inc. v. United States, 12 CI. Ct. 391, 396 {1987); Armijo v. United 
States, 663 F.2d 90, 95 {Ct. Cl. 1981); Southern Cal. Fm. Corp. v. United States, 634 F.2d 521, 
526 n.8 (Ct. CI. 1980); NBH Land Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 317, 319-20 {Ct. CI. 1978). 
But see Osprey Pac. Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 150, 157 {1998). 
Several federal courts outside this triumvirate have held similarly. See, e.g., Ramirez de 
Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1521-28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), vacated on other 
grounds, 471U.S. 1113 (1985); Mac'Avoy v. Smithsonian Inst., 757 F. Supp. 60, 70 (D.D.C. 
1991); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1241-45 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
17. See Department of Transp. v. Weisenfeld, 617 So. 2d 1071, 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993) {Harris, J., concurring) (interpreting expansively the language of a previous state case); 
Elkins-Swyers Office Equip. Co. v. Moniteau County, 209 S.W.2d 127, 131 {Mo. 1948) (hold­
ing that lack of authority destroys agency relationship); Ontario Knitting Co. v. New York, 98 
N.E. 909, 913 (N.Y. 1912) {holding that unauthorized action of state engineer was "void" and 
rejecting takings claim); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Board of Regents, 909 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 
App. 1995) {holding ultra vires actions tortious and therefore noncompensable under the 
Takings Clause); Reel Enters. v. City of La Crosse, 431 N.W.2d 743, 749 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) 
(arguing that ultra vires takings are by definition unripe); see also 29A C.J.S. Eminent Do­
main § 72, at 210 & n.57 (1992). 
18. Compare, e.g., Hooe, 218 U.S. at 335-36 {holding that ultra vires actions destroy the 
agency relationship between the government and responsible officers) with Firemen's Ins. 
Co., 909 S.W.2d at 543 (holding that ultra vires actions are torts, not takings) and Adams, 20 
CI. Ct. at 137 {holding that ultra vires actions violate the public use requirement). 
19. See, e.g., Klump v. United States, 38 Fed. CI. 243, 247 (1997); Earnest v. United 
States, 33 Fed. Cl. 341, 344 {1995); Ontario Knitting Co., 98 N.E. at 913. 
20. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) {dis­
cussing the "logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate [to determine 
whether] the proscribed use interests were . . .  part of his title to begin with"). 
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Clause, to call an action a "taking" says nothing about whether it is 
a compensable taking.2 1 
This Note relies on the latter two requirements to argue that 
courts hearing claims against state administrative agencies should 
follow the federal rule and refrain from holding those agencies lia­
ble under the Takings Clause for unauthorized actions.22 Part I 
maintains that ultra vires takings violate the state action require­
ment of the Takings Clause, as the law of agency indicates that ultra 
vires actions are not the actions of the sovereign. Part II argues 
that the "public use" requirement of the Takings Clause limits pay­
ment of just compensation in inverse condemnation cases2 3 to those 
circumstances in which the legislature has found that the taking will 
serve a public purpose. Because unauthorized agency actions by 
definition do not advance public uses, Part II concludes that such 
actions do not demand just compensation under the Clause. Fi­
nally, Part III contends that the intuition of fairness underlying the 
Takings Clause does not counsel against the arguments made in the 
first two Parts. Part III concludes that due process, tort, or legisla­
tive remedies might be available to an aggrieved property owner, 
but just compensation under the Takings Clause is not. This Note 
concludes that the Takings Clause is intended to compensate prop­
erty owners only for "otherwise proper"24 government actions that 
take private property, and ultra vires actions are not such "proper" 
actions. 
21. Nor does the fact that ultra vires takings are necessarily temporary takings make them 
necessarily compensable takings. The Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles required that governments pay just compensation for temporary tak­
ings where they would be liable for just compensation if the taking were permanent; the 
duration of the interference with property rights is irrelevant to its compensability under the 
Takings Clause. See 482 U.S. 304, 318 {1987) (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of 
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 {1981) {Brennan, J., dissenting)). Ultra vires takings are non­
compensable because they lack state action and fail to advance public uses, and the fact that 
they are also necessarily temporary changes nothing. Indeed, the First English Court empha­
sized that it dealt with "otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." 482 U.S. at 
315. Where an action lacks a public purpose or state action, it is not "otherwise proper" and 
not compensable under the Clause, regardless of whether it is permanent or temporary. 
22. Of course, such a rule may discourage a plaintiff from including in her complaint a 
claim that the action is unauthorized. Courts might nonetheless require that a plaintiff plead 
validity of the agency action as an element of her claim for just compensation. In any event, 
defendant agencies may raise invalidity as an affirmative defense to the claim. Cf. Florida 
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 899 {Fed. Cir. 1986). Agencies will want to 
use such a defense judiciously, however, as it will mean injunction of the regulation. 
23. "Inverse condemnation" refers to claims brought by property owners to obtain just 
compensation for property that the government took without first instituting formal eminent 
domain proceedings. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 & n.6 
{1984); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 {1980). 
24. First English, 482 U.S. at 315. 
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A takings claimant must demonstrate that her injury is the result 
of government action if the government is to be held accountable 
therefor. This Part argues that where a government agency lacks 
statutory authority for its action, the action cannot be attributed to 
the government and thus the government cannot be liable; the 
agency does not act as an agent at all. Section I.A maintains that 
the principle of authority well established in the law of agency indi­
cates that ultra vires agency actions cannot be compensable under 
the Takings Clause and that the doctrine of apparent authority can­
not save these claims. That section demonstrates that several 
Supreme Court cases have applied this rationale to reject ultra vires 
takings claims leveled at federal agencies. Section I.B argues that 
because the position of the responsible government agency in the 
federal system is irrelevant to the agency principles used in the 
Supreme Court cases, those cases and principles should be applied 
to reject ultra vires takings claims directed at state regulatory ac­
tions as well as their federal siblings. 
A. Authority and State Action 
Like most of the Constitution's provisions, the Takings Clause 
requires that a plaintiff allege governmental action to state a 
claim,25 though the Clause's use of the passive voice obscures the 
actors to whom the Clause is directed: "nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation."26 As an "inci­
dent of sovereignty," the taking power must be exercised by the 
sovereign or its delegate.27 Where the sovereign is not responsible 
for a taking, the taking cannot be compensable under the Constitu­
tion's Takings Clause. 
Section I.A.1 argues that, under the common law of agency, an 
agency's lack of authority means that the sovereign cannot be held 
25. See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883) (holding that "[t]he power to take 
private property . .. belongs to every independent government [and] is an incident of sover­
eignty"); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875) (holding that the right of eminent 
domain is "inseparable from sovereignty"). Only the Thirteenth, Eighteenth, and 1\venty­
Frrst Amendments directly address private action. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XVIII, 
XXI. "As a matter of substantive constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects 
judicial recognition of the fact that 'most rights secured by the Constitution are protected 
only against infringement by governments."' Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 
(1982) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978)). 
26. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (emphasis added). 
27. The reporters contain some cases in which a private entity has been a mediate actor in 
effecting a taking, generally by outright condemnation. In those cases, however, the taking 
power was delegated to the private party by a public entity. See, e.g., United States v. 
Gettysburg Blee. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896); Baldwin v. Appalachian Power Co., 556 
F .2 d 241, 242 (4th Cir. 1977) ; Thatcher v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 180 F.2d 644, 647 
(5th Cir. 1950). 
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liable for the agency's actions. The section maintains that the 
Supreme Court has rejected takings liability for federal agencies on 
this basis. Section I.A.2 contends that the doctrine of apparent au­
thority is consistent with this outcome. 
1. Authority 
The principle of authority applied in the common law of 
principal-agent relations indicates that ultra vires actions do not sat­
isfy the state action requirement. In general, principals cannot be 
subject to vicarious liability for the acts of their agents where those 
agents have acted without authority.28 Applying this principle to 
public officers, when government officials - public agents - have 
acted without statutory authority, their acts cannot be considered to 
be acts of the government - the public principal. While the re­
sponsible officers may be seen as acting in their individual capaci­
ties, they cannot be seen as acting as agents of the state. As a 
result, the state action component necessary to a takings claim is 
lacking and the government need not provide compensation to af­
fected property owners. On this basis, albeit without invoking 
agency law by name, the Supreme Court has rejected ultra vires 
takings claims directed at federal agency actions.29 The lower fed­
eral courts have also applied the Court's doctrine in many cases to 
reject just compensation liability.30 To be sure, the Court's rejec­
tions of ultra vires takings claims have been more frequent than its 
perfunctory discussions of the agency rationale therefor. 
28. See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958); liARoLD GILL 
REusCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAw OF AGENCY AND PAR1NERSHIP §§ 12-26 
(2d ed. 1990); W. EowARD SELL, SELL ON AGENCY§ 4 (1975). 
, 
29. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 127 n.16 (1974) (dic­
tum) (stating that "the Government action must be authorized" to give rise to a taking); 
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 330 (1922); United 
States v. North Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333 (1920) ("In order that the 
Government shall be liable it must appear that the officer who has physically taken posses­
sion of the property was duly authorized so to do, either directly by Congress or by the 
official upon whom Congress conferred the power."); Hughes v. United States, 230 U.S. 24, 
35 (1913); Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1910); United States v. Lynah, 188 
U.S. 435, 479 (1903) (Brown, J., concurring) ("[I]f property were seized or taken by officers 
of the government without authority of law, . . .  there could be no recovery . . . .  "), overruled 
in part on other grounds by United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St Paul & Pac. R.R., 312 
U.S. 592, 598 (1941); see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REv. 1449, 
1515-16 & n.252 (1990) (noting that the Supreme Court cases address the question whether 
"the government [is] liable for the actions of an agent acting outside her authority [and] raise 
the issue of whether the fifth amendment extends to actions, not by the government, but by 
individuals incidentally employed by the government'' (emphasis added)). 
30. See, e.g., Del-Rio Drilling Programs Inc. v. United States, No. 97-5055, 1998 WL 
321272, at *5-6 (Fed. Cir. June 18, 1998) (citing North Am. Transp., 253 U.S. at 333, and 
quoting Hooe, 218 U.S. at 335); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 898 
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing Portsmouth Harbor, 260 U.S. at 330); Northeast Sav. v. Office of 
Thrift Supervision, 770 F. Supp. 19, 24 n.4 (D.D.C. 1991) (quoting Regional Rail Reorganiza­
tion Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 127 n.16). 
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The Court stated the agency-based rule most clearly in Hooe v. 
United States, 31 where the plaintiff landowner sought just compen­
sation for the Civil Service Commission's occupation of more office 
space in plaintiff's building than was provided for in the Commis­
sion's lease.32 The Court rejected the takings claim, holding that: 
If an officer of the United States assumes, by virtue alone of his office, 
and without the authority of Congress, to take such matters under his 
control, he will not, in any legal or constitutional sense, represent the 
United States, and what he does or omits to do, without the authority 
of the Congress, cannot create a claim against the Government 
"founded upon the Constitution." It would be a claim having its ori­
gin in a violation of the Constitution. The [Takings Clause] is directed 
against the Government, and not against individual or public officers 
proceeding without the authority of legislative enactment. The taking 
of private property by an officer of the United States for public use, 
without being authorized, expressly or by necessary implication, to do 
so by some act of Congress, is not the act of the Government. 33 
By announcing that when an agency acts ultra vires the agency does 
not "in any legal or constitutional sense, represent the United 
States"34 or that the action is not "the act of the United States"35 or 
that "neither the government nor any other principal is bound by 
the unauthorized acts of its agents,"36 the Court has fairly impli­
cated the law of agency. 
A line of analogous cases confirms that the Court was looking to 
the law of agency in its ultra vires takings cases. In its sovereign 
immunity cases the Court has examined in greater detail govern­
ment liability for ultra vires action, expressly applying agency law to 
distinguish "officer suits" from those directed at the government: 
unlike suits directly against the government, officer suits are not 
31. 218 U.S. 322 (1910). 
32. See 218 U.S. at 326-27. 
33. 218 U.S. at 335-36 (latter two emphases added). The meaning and import of the 
Court's distinguishing an ultra vires takings claim as "a claim having its origin in a violation 
of the Constitution" from one "founded upon the Constitution" is obscure. It may mean that 
while compensation is unavailable, injunctive relief may be available as a remedy for a "vio­
lation" of the Takings Clause. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
34. Hooe, 218 U.S. at 335. 
35. Hughes v. United States, 230 U.S. 24, 35 (1913). Three years after Hooe, the Court in 
Hughes considered a compensation claim for flood damage to plaintiff's property resulting 
from the government's construction of a new levee and the dynamiting of an old levee. See 
230 U.S. at 25, 34. In rejecting the claim, the Court found that the unauthorized act "cannot 
be held to be the act of the United States, and therefore affords no ground in any event for 
holding that the United States had taken the property for public use." 230 U.S. at 35 (em­
phasis added). 
36. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 479 (1903) (Brown, J., concurring), overruled in 
part on other grounds by United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 
592, 598 (1941). 
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barred by sovereign immunity.37 In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corp., 38 the Court applied agency principles to find that 
the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief was barred by sovereign im­
munity: "We hold that if the actions of an officer do not conflict 
with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the 
actions of the sovereign .. . if they would be regarded as the actions 
of a private principal under the normal rules of agency. "39 The neg­
ative implication of Larson is that where agency actions do conflict 
with "the terms of ... valid statutory authority" - or presumably 
where they lack statutory authority 4° - then they are not "the ac­
tions of the sovereign" and the sovereign cannot be held liable 
therefor.41 
Several jurists have looked to Larson to identify those agency 
actions that are ultra vires and therefore noncompensable. In Del­
Rio Drilling Programs Inc. v. United States, 42 the Federal Circuit 
applied the Supreme Court's ultra vires takings cases and expressly 
relied on Larson's agency-based understanding of unauthorized ac­
tion in defining those actions that cannot be compensable because 
they cannot be considered acts of the sovereign.43 Then-Judge 
Scalia drew a similar connection between Larson and the Hooe line 
of cases in his dissent to an en bane reversal in Ramirez de Arellano 
v. Weinberger:44 "[T]he question whether a government officer was 
37. "Officer suits" are directed at public officers individually but provide relief "run[ning] 
against the government," as in situations where an official is named as the defendant in a suit 
for injunctive relief but the government is thereby effectively enjoined as well. See John F. 
Duffy, Comment, Sovereign Immunity, the Officer Suit Fiction, and Entitlement Benefits, 56 
U. Cm. L. REv. 295, 295 (1989). Officer suits are distinguishable from suits brought against 
officers in their personal capacity, where the relief sought does not impinge on the govern­
ment, see id. at 295 n.4, as where a plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages 
from individual officers for deprivations of constitutional rights, see infra section ll.B.l. 
38. 337 U.S. 682 (1949). 
39. 337 U.S. at 695 (emphasis added). 
40. The meaning of "conflict with" has been muddied since Larson. Although the Larson 
court clearly meant to distinguish "wrongful" actions - such as tortious actions - from 
those that "conflict with the terms of [an officer's] valid statutory authority," the latter cate­
gory apparently was narrowed in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89 (1984), so as to exclude actions that are prohibited by state law. See David P. Currie, 
Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 SuP. Cr. REv. 149, 166-67. 
Pennhurst does not alter Larson with respect to actions for which the agency altogether 
lacked authority, but in practice this fine distinction may be difficult to make. 
41. Larson, 337 U.S. at 695; cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
635-36 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum . . . . In these circum­
stances, and in these only, may he be said . . .  to personify the federal sovereignty."). 
42. No. 97-5055, 1998 WL 321272, at *l (Fed. Cir. June 18, 1998). 
43. See 1998 WL 321272, at *5-6 (citing Larson, 337 U.S. at 695 and Hooe v. United 
States, 218 U.S. 322, 335 (1910)). 
44. 745 F.2d 1500, 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Scalia, J., dissenting), vacated on other 
grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985). The Del-Rio court favorably cited Judge Scalia's original 
appellate opinion. See Del Rio, 1998 WL 321272, at *6 (citing Ramirez de Arellano, 724 F.2d 
143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), revd. en bane on other grounds, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
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acting sufficiently within bis authorized powers to permit a [just 
compensation] remedy is precisely the same as the question whether 
he was acting sufficiently within bis authorized powers to preclude 
injunctive relief against him .... "45 These cases confirm that both 
the ultra vires takings cases and the cases discussing the ultra vires 
exception to sovereign immunity are both based on orthodox 
agency principles. 
In response to the argument that agency principles prohibit pay­
ment of just compensation for ultra vires actions, one might point to 
the several cases in which the Court has held that an official clothed 
with governmental authority may be considered to have violated a 
plaintiff's rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment even if she lacked authority 
to act.46 The reason for this inconsistency with the Court's ultra 
vires takings cases is admittedly obscure. 
Professor Tribe poses one possible explanation based on the 
Takings Clause's unique attributes. He suggests that: "[T]here are 
some constitutional prohibitions that the acts of individual govern­
ment officials cannot in isolation violate. These prohibitions con­
cern themselves with more systematic government activity and thus, 
in their light, individual acts simply cannot rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation."47 Although he does not cite the Supreme 
Court's ultra vires takings cases, he finds that the Takings Clause is 
one of the "clearest instances of norms ordinarily addressed to legal 
systems as a whole rather than to individual government actors,"48 
and thus that the ultra vires action that satisfied the state action 
requirement of substantive due process in Home Telephone & Tele­
graph might not satisfy that of the Takings Clause. Although Tribe 
provides no further explanation for this view of the Clause, it may 
be based on the Clause's nature as a condition on legitimate gov­
ernmental action and not a protection against illegitimate govern­
mental action: 
45. Ramirez de Arellano, 145 F.2d at 1554 (en bane) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). Judge Scalia also reiterated the Supreme Court's use of agency principles in its ultra 
vires takings cases. See 145 F.2d at 1551 (arguing that if a taking is authorized it is "thereby 
an act of the United States" and compensable); 745 F.2d at 1556 (arguing that compensability 
depends on "whether that action was sufficiently authorized by law to justify attributing it to 
the United States"). 
46. See Home Tel. & Tel. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123, 159-61 (1908); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879); see also Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982) (characterizing Ex parte Virginia as standing 
for the rule that "the actions of a state officer who exceeds the limits of his authority consti­
tute state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment"); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., 
HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1225 n.1 (3d ed. 
1988) (suggesting a conflict between Home Telegraph & Telephone and the ultra vires takings 
cases). 
47. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITt.JTIONAL LAW § 18-4, at 1704 (2d ed. 1988). 
48. Id. at 1705 n.15. 
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[The Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of private property, 
but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power . . . . [It] 
is designed not to limit governmental interference with property 
rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of other­
wise proper interference amounting to a taking.49 
That is, due process or equal protection may reach the actions of 
rogue officials because those provisions are intended to remedy 
wrongful actions by governmental officials, whether authorized or 
not. As the Court in First English suggested, however, the Takings 
Clause does not speak to such wrongful actions. 
Whatever the explanation for the rule applied under the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Supreme Court has re­
stated the agency rule for the Takings Clause numerous times since 
Ex parte Young, Ex parte Virginia, and Home Telephone & Tele­
graph. 50 As a result, the agency rule still controls the question of 
regulatory ultra vires takings. 
* * * 
The law of agency applied in federal ultra vires takings cases 
and sovereign immunity cases provides that actions without author­
ity are not the actions of the state. The Takings Clause provides no 
compensation remedy for claims that are not predicated on state 
action. 
2. Apparent Authority 
If agency law is to be the basis of a defense to a takings claim, 
then perhaps the government should still be held liable where there 
was apparent authority for the action.51 The doctrine of apparent 
49. Frrst English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
314-15 (1987) (citations omitted). 
50. See cases cited supra note 29; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1016 & n.19 (1984); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952); 343 
U.S. 631-32 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
51. See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8. At least one 
court has found apparent authority adequate to give rise to a compensable taking. See Sil­
berman v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 895, 896 (D. Mass. 1947) (finding "apparent authority" 
and "ostensible authority" to take plaintiffs' property adequate to bind the government to 
payment of compensation). But see Elkins-Swyers Office Equip. Co. v. Moniteau County, 
209 S.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Mo. 1948) (expressly rejecting application of apparent authority to 
support ultra vires takings claim). The Silberman court hinted, however, that the taking's 
having occurred during time of war and having been done by a military officer was signifi­
cant. See 71 F. Supp. at 896. 
Liability might also be predicated on the nebulous principle of "inherent agency power." 
This theory is apparently a creature of the Restatement itself, see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY, supra note 28, § SA, which admits that it is a catch-all category established ex post 
to describe cases that do not appear to fit into the other categories of authority. See 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 161 cmt. a. As argued infra in the 
context of apparent authority, however, because the terms of a government agent's authority 
are publicly available, this "doctrine" should not apply. 
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authority holds that where a principal had made manifestations of 
an agent's authority to a third party, and the manifestations re­
sulted in harm to that party, the principal's liability should be deter­
mined as if she had actually authorized the agent.s2 Because agency 
officers responsible for an ultra vires taking possessed the trappings 
of authority when they "took" the property, they might be said to 
have possessed apparent authority for the taking. To the contrary, 
two arguments counsel against applying apparent authority to hold 
the government liable for an ultra vires taking. 
First, the government cannot be liable, because an ultra vires 
agency action cannot have been apparently authorized. Apparent 
authority is a concern only where the terms of an agent's actual 
authority were concealed from the injured party. This generally oc­
curs in either of two situations. In the first, a principal overtly 
grants authority to an agent but privately modifies the agent's au­
thority. Acting based on the principal's overt grant of authority, a 
third party is harmed by the agent. That the principal had privately 
modified the agent's authority such that the act was not in fact au­
thorized is deemed irrelevant; the agent possessed apparent author­
ity.s3 In the second, the principal has placed the agent in a position 
to which certain duties and authorities traditionally attach, though 
in fact the principal has limited the agent's authority or failed to 
authorize the agent to do something that a person in the agent's 
position would normally be authorized to do.s4 
Neither situation obtains, however, where government agents 
are concerned. The simple reason is that the actual terms of the 
agent's authority are a matter of public record, available to all; gov­
ernments do not establish or alter the authority of their agents in 
secret. In short, apparent and actual authority are identical for 
public officers. Apparent authority is thus irrelevant to the actions 
of public officers, a point on which numerous federal and state 
courts have agreed.ss Applied to the present topic, this principle 
52. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8; REusCHLEIN & 
GREGORY, supra note 28, § 23; SELL, supra note 28, § 35. 
53. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8 cmt. a, illus. 1-3. 
54. 
Under an apparent authority theory, "[l]iability is based upon the fact that the agent's 
position facilitates the consummation of the fraud, in that from the point of view of the 
third person the transaction seems regular on its face and the agent appears to be acting 
in the ordinary course of the business confided to him." 
American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 566 (1982) 
(quoting REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 261 cmt. a). This is some­
times referred to as "power of position." See, e.g., Bucher & Willis Consulting Engrs., Plan­
ners & Architects v. Smith, 643 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982). 
55. See, e.g., Margalli-Olvera v. I.N.S., 43 F.3d 345, 353 (8th Cir. 1994); Schaefer v. Anne 
Arundel County, 17 F.3d 711, 714 (4th Cir. 1994); Thomas v. I.N.S., 35 F.3d 1332, 1338 (9th 
Cir. 1994); Healey v. Town of New Durham Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 665 A.2d 360, 367 
(N.H. 1995); Baker v. Deschutes County, 498 P.2d 803, 805 (Or. Ct. App. 1972); Moore v. 
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means that a government agency cannot have possessed apparent 
authority for an ultra vires taking.56 That a reviewing court held 
that the relevant statutes and regulations do not give the agency the 
authority to act as it did means that the plaintiff property owner 
cannot claim that the state made any manifestation of the agency's 
authority.57 
Second, even assuming that apparent authority were applicable 
to a takings scenario, a state could not be held liable for an ultra 
vires taking because the state's putative manifestation of authority 
did not cause the harm to the property owner; the property owner 
has not relied on the manifestation.58 Apparent authority is gener­
ally justified under two theories: the objective theory of contract, 
or estoppel.59 Both theories demand that the manifestation of au­
thority caused the harm to the plaintiff. On the first theory, the 
principal is held to be bound by his objective manifestation of au­
thority to contract where the plaintiff has made what she thought to 
be a contract in reliance on that manifestation. 60 The second theory 
applies in tort, where a third party has detrimentally relied in some 
way on the principal's manifestation of the agent's authority.61 In 
the ultra vires takings case, however, the property owner has not 
relied or otherwise been harmed by the manifestation of authority. 
The property owner's belief that the regulatory agency possessed 
Attorney General, 820 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App. 1991); see also Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annota­
tion, Doctrine of Apparent Authority As Applied To Agent of Municipality, 11 A.L.R. 3o 925, 
§ 2 (1977). 
56. Because of the public availability of the terms of agencies' authority, the mere fact 
that the public officers responsible for an ultra vires taking were clothed with the appearance 
of state authority is irrelevant The third party's belief of the agent 's authority must be rea­
sonable, see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8, cmt. c, which it is not 
where the terms of actual authority are available. 
57. Courts nonetheless may be sympathetic to property owners in this position, given the 
vagaries of statutory interpretation. In many cases, ultra vires takings will occur because the 
agency itself misread the governing statilte. See, e.g., Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal 
Commn., 953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998). If the agency cannot properly interpret the statutes it 
administers, property owners can hardly be expected to understand the extent of an agency's 
authority. Such equitable concerns, however, have not dissuaded courts from almost unani­
mously refusing to apply the doctrine of apparent authority to public officers. See supra note 
55 and accompanying text. Those courts' holdings are supported by the longstanding rule 
that ignorance of the law is no defense. See Hawkins v. United States, 96 U.S. 689, 691 
(1877) ("Individuals ... must take notice of the extent of the authority conferred by law upon 
a person acting in an official capacity; and the rule applies, in such a case, that ignorance of 
the law furnishes no excuse for any mistake or wrongful act."). On the longstanding rule 
generally, see JEROME HAu., GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 383 (2d ed. 1960) 
("To permit an individual to plead successfully that he had a different opinion or interpreta­
tion of the law would contradict the ... postulates of a legal order."). 
58. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8 cmt. d (stating that "reli-
ance ... is required when the claim is based upon apparent authority "). 
59. See id.; REuscHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 28, § 23(A), (B). 
60. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8 cmt. d. 
61. See id.; see also id. § 265(2) (asserting that principals are "not liable in tort for conduct 
of [an] agent merely because it is within his apparent authority"). 
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authority to regulate is irrelevant to the agency's unilateral taking 
of the plaintiff's property; the taking would have harmed the prop­
erty owner with or without the manifestation of authority. 
* * * 
The principle of authority from the law of agency demands that 
public officials have authority if the sovereign is to be vicariously 
liable for their actions. The Supreme Court has held as much in 
rejecting federal ultra vires takings claims. The doctrine of appar­
ent authority does not change this outcome because it is inapplica­
ble to government agents and the appearance of authority is not the 
cause of the property owner's harm. 
B. Application to State Claims 
Although the Supreme Court cases establishing the agency rule 
have involved only claims leveled at federal agencies,62 courts 
should also apply the rule to takings claims aimed at state agen­
cies. 63 The Supreme Court cases indicate that ultra vires agency 
actions are not the actions of the sovereign, and they thus lack the 
state action component required by the Takings Clause.64 That 
each of the cited cases involved a claim against a federal, rather 
than state, agency must be irrelevant; the level of government re­
sponsible for the taking is a distinction without a difference. In no 
case was the Court's basis for its decision peculiar to federal sover­
eignty; rather the Court decided each on the basic agency-law prin­
ciple of authority, which itself is equally applicable to the federal 
and state governments. 65 
Indeed, in its sovereign immunity cases, the Court has treated 
state and federal governments similarly in applying agency princi­
ples. In considering the extent of the Eleventh Amendment's pro­
tection of states from suit in the federal courts,66 the Supreme Court 
has relied on principles developed in its cases involving the sover­
eign immunity of the federal government. For instance, in 
62. In fact, apparently no Supreme Court case has involved an ultra vires takings claim 
directed at a state agency. 
63. At least one state court has applied the agency theory in rejecting a state ultra vires 
claim. See Elkins-Swyers Office Equip. Co. v. Moniteau County, 209 S.W.2d 127, 130-31 
(Mo. 1948) (citing Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910)). 
64. See cases cited supra note 29. 
65. The federal ultra vires takings cases are not, strictly speaking, binding precedent for 
state claims cases. Because the Court's rationale is equally applicable to both, however, 
courts should apply the federal cases to state claims, if for no other reason than that the 
Supreme Court is likely to do so itself once such a claim reaches its docket. 
66. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con­
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, co=enced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). 
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Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 67 an Eleventh 
Amendment case, the Court discussed the ultra vires exception 
elaborated in Larson, a federal sovereign immunity case.68 Because 
the Court has applied the holding in Larson to a state immunity 
case, it is hardly a stretch to apply the underlying principles of the 
federal ultra vires takings cases to state ultra vires takings claims as 
well. 
Finally, the common law of agency is as applicable to state agen­
cies as it is to federal agencies and private parties. Agency law is 
applicable to both federal and state governments for the same rea­
son it is applicable to both private and public principals: the funda­
mental relationship of principal and agent is used in both public and 
private settings to reduce the costs of collective action in a complex 
world.69 The law of agency - and authority specifically - sets out 
the ground rules for the principal-agent relationship and in so doing 
·establishes the conditions in which an agent's actions may impose 
liability on the agent's principal.70 Where such principal-agent rela­
tionships exist, the common law of agency governs the allocation of 
liability among the principal, the agent, and the injured party, ab­
sent some statutory or constitutional abrogation of that doctrine.71 
No provision of the federal Constitution expressly or impliedly al­
ters the law of agency relations of the several states. As a result, 
unless the constitution or statutes of a particular state do so, the 
common law of agency should control, and courts should tum away 
takings claims aimed at state officers' ultra vires actions. 
* * * 
The Supreme Court has held that the ultra vires actions of fed­
eral agencies cannot be considered acts of the sovereign and thus 
67. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
68. See 465 U.S. at 112-17 (discussing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 
337 U.S. 682 (1949)); see also Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 
693 (1982) (plurality opinion) (applying Larson in the Eleventh Amendment context). 
69. See REusCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 28, § 1, at 3 ("The division of labor, the 
ready means of transportation and the growth of cooperative enterprises largely in the form 
of corporations, both public and private, dictate the need for agents."); see also id. ("Officers 
and employees of the nation, states and municipalities are agents."). 
70. See REusCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 28, §§ 1, 3. 
71. This should plainly suggest what this Note implies throughout: that state law can in 
some circumstances, define a government's liability under the federal Takings Clause. This is 
not a novel idea. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) 
(indicating that courts should apply state law to define "property" as used in the Takings 
Clause) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); cf. 
Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. 
REv. 699, 703-04 {1992) (suggesting that common law principles can and should guide consti­
tutional interpretation); Samuel C. Kaplan, "Grab Bag of Principles" or Principled Grab 
Bag?: The Constitutionalization of Common Law, 49 S.C. L. REv. 463 (1998) (discussing 
three areas in which the Supreme Court has relied on common law principles in elaborating 
constitutional doctrine). 
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cannot impose liability on the sovereign under the Takings Clause. 
By the Court's reasoning, where a state or federal agency official 
has acted without authority, a state government cannot be account­
able on a takings theory absent some relevant, state-specific modifi­
cation of the law of agency. 
II. THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT 
The Takings Clause provides that "private property [shall not] 
be taken for public use, without just compensation."72 The public 
use requirement appears to be the descendant of similar language 
in the writings of early civil law commentators on the sovereign 
power of eminent domain, that consistently emphasized that the 
taking power should be exercised only for public benefit. 13 Echoing 
these early scholars, several courts have noted the public use re­
quirement's importance: "[I]t is just as important that the proposed 
use of the property be limited to what the court decides to be a 
'really public' use as it is that the property owner be given just 
compensation. "74 
Notwithstanding the public use requirement's deep roots and 
apparent importance, it makes only sporadic appearances in inverse 
condemnation cases - perhaps because litigants have adopted the 
widespread view among legal commentators that contemporary 
takings doctrine has essentially excised the requirement from the 
Takings Clause.75 Whatever the reason for the provision's apparent 
72. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added). 
73. See 2 JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE I'ruNCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 
part ill, ch. V, § XXVI (Thomas Nugent trans., 3d ed. 1784) {1748); 2 CORNELIUS VAN 
BYNKERSHOEK, QuAESTioNUM Jurus PUBLICI Lmru Duo bk. II, ch. XV, at 221 (Tenney 
Frank trans., Clarendon Press 1930) (1737) ("[N]ecessity or public utility is requisite for the 
exercise of eminent domain."); 2 Huoo GRonus, DE JuRE BELLI ET PACIS bk. II, ch. XIV, 
§ VII (Francis W. Kelsey et al. trans., Clarendon Press 1925) {1625) ("[T]htough the agency 
of the king even a right gained by subjects can be taken from them . . .  [b]ut in order that this 
may be done by the power of eminent domain the first requisite is public advantage . . . .  "); 2 
SAMUEL PvFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM Lmru Ocro bk. VIII, ch. V, § 7, at 
1285 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688) ("[W]hen 
something belonging to one or a few citizens is required for the necessary uses of the com­
monwealth, the supreme sovereignty will be able to seize that thing for the necessities of the 
state . . . .  "). For a discussion of these co=entators' influence on the Framers, see Joseph L. 
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 54 & n.100 (1964); William B. Stoebuck, 
A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 595 {1972). 
74. Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171, 193 (Wash. 1959); see also Customer Co. v. 
City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 921 (Cal. 1995) {Kennard, J., concurring) ("The 'use' re­
quirement is a central part of the constitutional text. To ignore it is to tum the just­
compensation clause into a facially open-ended right to compensation for any government 
action that affects the value or use of private property."). 
75. Many have argued that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the public use require­
ment as coextensive with states' police powers, see infra sections II.A and II.C, has effectively 
rendered the public use requirement useless. See generally, e.g., Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the 
Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REv. 531 (1995); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of 
Public Use, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 61 {1986); Rubenfeld, supra note 2; Note, The Public Use 
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desuetude, this Note argues that the public use requirement is dis­
positive of ultra vires takings claims. Section II.A maintains that 
the constitutional separation of powers indicates that definition of 
"public use" is a legislative function and argues that the Supreme 
Court has held likewise. Section II.A contends that, as a result, an 
agency action without legislative approval cannot advance a public 
use. Section II.B argues that the language of the Takings Clause 
straightforwardly demands that a taking be for a public use if just 
compensation is to be awarded. Section II.C argues that the public 
use argument made in this Part is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's so-called "police power takings" test. Because ultra vires 
actions by definition cannot advance public uses, and because the 
Takings Clause requires a public use before demanding just com­
pensation, Part II concludes that ultra vires actions need not be 
compensated under the Takings Clause.76 
A. Defining a "Public Use" 
When considering a takings claim, a court must determine, ex­
plicitly or implicitly, which branch of government is the proper in­
terpreter of the constitutional requirement of public use.77 The 
court could make its own decision about what constitutes a public 
use and compare the challenged action to that standard, or the 
court might accord deference to the decision of the legislature, or 
even the agency itself, finding that one or the other is empowered 
and competent to decide the question. If an agency may properly 
make such a decision, the court might find a public use even where 
the agency has acted without statutory authority. If, however, the 
legislature must have a hand in defining public use, an agency's ac­
tion cannot advance a public use by definition if the action lacked 
statutory authorization. Section II.A.l argues that the legislature, 
as the most "public" branch of government, is the proper exponent 
Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949). This Note 
maintains that the public use requirement is not useless and argues for an interpretation of 
the requirement that is consistent with the Supreme Court case law but which state­
government litigants may profitably use to defend against claims for just compensation. 
76. A very few federal courts have held as much. See Adams v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 
132, 137 (1990); Catalina Properties, Inc. v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 763, 764 (Ct. Cl. 
1958); see also Mac'Avoy v. Smithsonian Inst., 757 F. Supp. 60, 70 (D.D.C. 1991) (quoting 
Adams). 
77. Professor Bickel described the Framers as having established a rough "allocation of 
competences" in the three constitutional branches of government. See ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 103-04 (1962). In Marbury v. Madison, the Court 
seemed to adopt a similar view, justifying judicial review on the Court's special ability to 
interpret law. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803). This section argues that the text of the 
Takings Clause suggests that the courts are not the branch of government "competent" to 
discern public from nonpublic uses. 
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of public purposes.78 Section II.A.2 contends that agencies cannot 
decide sua sponte which actions advance public purposes because 
they generally lack both the inherent constitutional power to make 
such determinations and the indicia of representativeness possessed 
by the legislature, and thus they cannot make such determinations 
except where authority is delegated by the legislature. Finally, sec­
tion II.A.3 argues that courts should not make their own judgments 
in the course of takings litigation of whether a particular agency 
action in fact advanced a public purpose. Section II.A concludes 
that because the legislature properly determines which "uses" are 
"public," either expressly or by implication in the course of legislat­
ing, an ultra vires agency action cannot advance a public use. 
1. The Legislature 
The most "public" of the branches of government, the legisla­
ture, must decide which government actions will advance public 
uses,79 as the text of the public use requirement suggests. The 
"public philosophy"80 underlying our constitutional order suggests 
that determinations of the "public interest" are by definition the 
result of representative rather than analytical processes: contention 
for and representatives' deliberation over policy outcomes is the 
closest thing we have to a guarantee that those outcomes will serve 
public purposes.81 In other words, "public purposes" demand polit­
ical decision and are not susceptible to ex ante, objective determi­
nation; no calculation or application of technical expertise will 
identify that which is in the public interest.s2 
78. The Supreme Court has used "public use" and "public purpose" interchangeably, see 
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 {1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 
{1954), and the terms are therefore used synonymously in this Note. 
79. See United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 309 F. Supp. 887, 902 (N.D. Tex. 1969); 
see also Merrill, supra note 75, at 68 (noting that ascribing this role to the legislative branch is 
not surprising in a "society committed to majoritarian rule"). 
80. Professor Sandel has defined "public philosophy" as a "vision . . .  embodied in our 
legal and political practices." Michael J. Sandel, The Order of the Coif Annual Lecture: The 
Constitution of the Procedural Republic, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 2 (1997); see also WALTER 
LIPPMANN, THE PUBuc PHu.osoPHY 101 {1955). 
81. This is true of both of the primary strains of American "public philosophy": classical 
liberalism and civic republicanism. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN 7-18 (1984) (noting classical liberal influences on the 
Framers); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and 
the Political Process, 95 CoLUM. L. Rev. 782, 818 (1995) (discussing the civic republican 
thread of the founding philosophy). At a high level of generality, classical liberalism rejects 
the notion of a public interest apart from an aggregation of individual private interests, a 
function served - however imperfectly - in the economic sphere by markets and in govern· 
ment by legislatures. See EPSTEIN, supra, at 13. Civic republican philosophy relies on the 
process of legislative deliberation to identify the public interest. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked 
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM. L. Rev. 1689, 1691 {1984). 
82. See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATORY POLICY 140 {3d ed. 1992); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
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The Supreme Court has recognized this fact and has repeatedly 
held that the legislature is the proper branch of government to de­
cide which actions comprehend public uses.s3 The Court's primary 
discussion of its position came in Berman v. Parker, s4 which in­
volved the condemnation of the plaintiffs' District of Columbia 
property under an urban redevelopment statute.85 In upholding ap­
plication of the statute to the plaintiffs' property, the Court held: 
The definition [of public use] is essentially the product of legislative 
determinations addressed to the purposes of government . . . . Subject 
to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, 
the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In 
such cases the legislature . . .  is the main guardian of the public needs 
to be served by social legislation . . . .  s6 
Because this deference to legislative pronouncements is rooted in 
basic separation of powers concerns,87 the Court has also held that 
such deference cannot be limited to Congress but also must be ac­
corded to state legislatures.ss 
As a result, the legislature must expressly or by implication ac­
knowledge that the action to be taken by an agency will advance a 
public use.s9 Such an implication may be found in the legislature's 
CALCULUS OF CoNSENT 284-86 (1962); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HAR.v. L. REv. 1667, 1683 (1975). 
83. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422-24 
(1992); FJISt English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
321 (1987); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-43; Berman 348 U.S. at 32; Monongahela Navigation Co. 
v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893). These cases specifically compare the competences 
of the legislature and judiciary in determining what constitutes a public use, but their lan­
guage is sufficiently broad to suggest that the legislature is the best of all three branches of 
government. See, e.g., infra quote accompanying note 90. 
In its public use cases, the Court has echoed a number of early constitUtional commenta­
tors. See THOMAS M. CooLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REsr UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE .AMERICAN UNION 532 (1868) 
("[I]f the public interest can be in any way promoted by the· taking of private property, it 
must rest in the wisdom of the legislature to determine whether the benefit to the public will 
be of sufficient importance . . . .  "); 2 JAMES KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 276 
(1827) ("It undoubtedly must rest in the wisdom of the legislature to determine when public 
uses require the assumption of private property . . . .  "); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE 
ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY 
AND CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 514 (1857) ("[T]he legislature is the sole judge as to the fact 
whether the public welfare demands the sacrifice of the private right."); id. at 512. 
84. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
85. See 348 U.S. at 31. 
86. 348 U.S. at 32. 
87. See, e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244 ("Judicial deference is required because, in our 
system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be 
advanced by an exercise of the taking power."). 
88. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244; Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
89. Property owners need not worry that such a rule would allow a legislature to immu­
nize its agencies from takings liability by simply stating in the statute that the resultant action 
would not advance a public purpose. A statute that expressly admitted that it would advance 
no public purpose would violate the Due Process Clause. See discussion infra section II.C. 
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authorization of a program to be implemented by an agency - the 
legislature's adoption of a piece of legislation constitutes an implicit 
judgment that the resultant program will advance a public pur­
pose.90 Where an action taken by an agency lacks statutory author­
ity, the legislature has not implicitly or expressly identified that 
action as advancing a public use, and therefore courts must hold 
that the action does not advance a public use.91 Although a court 
may review and occasionally reject a legislature's implicit or explicit 
definition of public use,92 a court cannot approve an executive ac­
tion that altogether lacks the necessary legislative imprimatur. 
2. Administrative Agencies 
Several independent reasons dictate that courts should not give 
administrative agencies the authority to define public uses unilater­
ally. The structure of the Constitution indicates that the executive 
branch, and thus administrative agencies,93 possess no inherent 
power to identify public purposes. Although administrative agen­
cies are frequently trusted with broad discretion in the management 
of public policy,94 that trust is granted only where the executive is 
acting under inherent power95 or is administering a statute enacted 
90. This reflects the view that the legislature's representative character demands that its 
enactments be assumed, where reasonably possible, to bespeak public purposes. Cf. Berman, 
348 U.S. at 32 ("[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in 
terms well-nigh conclusive."). 
91. Without legislative authorization, no type of administrative action can be said to ad­
vance a public purpose. Even if the agency had acted ultra vires so as to provide the public 
with the "use" of a piece of property in some literal way, for instance by creating a public 
park or right of way, the action could not be said to have advanced a public use. The Court 
has consistently rejected such a literal understanding of the public use requirement. See, e.g., 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 
U.S. 700, 707 (1920), cited in Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244; see also Stoebuck, supra note 73, at 590 
(noting that the Supreme Court has "made clear that 'public use' cannot be argued in any 
literal sense"). 
92. See infra section Il.A.3. 
93. The federal Constitution makes little reference to administrative agencies. See, e.g., 
U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, 'l! 1 (mentioning "executive Departments"). The Supreme Court 
nonetheless has since recognized agencies' role as repositories of the president's executive 
responsibilities under Article II. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132 (1926) 
(referring to agency officials as "exercising not their own [will] but [the president's] 
discretion"). 
94. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-27 (1944) (upholding as constitu­
tional a statute delegating authority to an agency to fix "fair and equitable" prices); J.W. 
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (requiring only an "intelligible 
principle" to guide agencies to sustain a delegation as constitutional). 
95. In the federal context, such powers are enumerated in Article II. See U.S. CoNST. art. 
II. 
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by the legislature.96 Under Article II of the federal Constitution,97 
the executive has only limited powers beyond "tak[ing] care that 
the laws be faithfully executed,"98 none of which can be interpreted 
reasonably to include unilateral determinations of the public pur­
poses of its actions. Where a state constitution does not give gen­
eral lawmaking power to the executive, administrative agencies 
simply lack the constitutional power to decide the question of pub­
lic use where they have not been given authority to act by the legis­
lature.99 Professor Stoebuck has made the same point with regard 
to eminent domain: "[I]f no legislative body . . .  has authorized a 
road from point A to point B, land for such a road may not be 
condemned. In such cases as these, then, it seems inevitable, even 
truistic, to say there is a public-purpose limitation on the exercise of 
the eminent power."100 
Because agencies have no power to determine on their own 
which actions advance public purposes, the legislature must either 
specify which actions will advance public uses or impliedly delegate 
that determination to the agency. Where the legislature has not 
spoken and thus the agency lacks statutory authority for its action, 
that action cannot be said to advance a public use. 
Agencies also lack the indicia of representativeness that legisla­
tures possess, and therefore lack the "public" character demanded 
by the text of the Takings Clause. Although governors and presi­
dents are elected, one can question their ability to bend effectively 
96. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum."). 
97. Although the structure of the applicable state constitution is the proper inquiry, most 
of the states' constitutions mirror the federal in basic structure. See WILLI P. AnAMs, THE 
Fmsr AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 4 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 
U.N.C. Press 1980) (1973); ROBERT B. DISHMAN, NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, STATE 
CoNSTITUTIONs: THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT 5-6 (1960). Of course, were a state consti­
tution to provide otherwise, this argument would be inapplicable. Again, the use of state law 
to define the boundaries of constitutional strictures is well-established. See supra note 75. 
98. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3. The executive powers are enumerated in Article II, §§ 2-3. 
99. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 588 (finding that although the Presi­
dent lacked power to issue order seizing steel mills, "[t]he power of Congress to adopt such 
public policies . . .  is beyond question"). 
To what extent the legislature may delegate the determination to an agency - expressly 
or implicitly - is not at issue here. This Note does not argue that agencies cannot make such 
determinations where the legislature has expressly delegated that decision to the agency or a 
statute provides ambiguity or silence from which a court can reasonably infer that the legisla­
ture intended to delegate the decision to the agency. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. F.C.C., 24 F.3d 
1441, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1994). This Note considers only cases in which a court has found that 
the agency altogether lacks authority for its action and has thus invalidated it. 
100. Stoebuck, supra note 73, at 588-89. 
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their subordinates' actfons to the will of the electorate.1°1 The lack 
of a broad electoral constituency is compounded by agencies' ten­
dency to be, at worst, "captured" and, at best, strongly influenced, 
by narrow constituencies,102 or dominated by their internal institu­
tional dynamics103 or their employees' ideologies.104 Although one 
could hardly suggest that legislatures are uninfluenced by narrow 
interests, 105 legislatures in the American system have been designed 
to reduce the dominant influence of any one such "faction,"106 and 
have proven more successful than agencies in avoiding capture by a 
single interest by encouraging the participation of myriad, counter­
vailing groups.107 Notwithstanding that legislatures plainly fail to 
101. See GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY 101-05 {1980); JoHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dismusr. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvrnw 131 {1980) (not­
ing elected executives' "spasmodic[ ]" control of bureaucrats); JAMES Q. WILSON, BuREAU­
CRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 257-60 (1989) 
(discussing Presidents' ongoing struggles to control the federal bureaucracy). 
102. See generally LAWRENCE s. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
PoLmcs 10-13 {1994) (providing general overview of capture theory); James Q. \Vtlson, The 
Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT 135, 157-
64 (James W. McKie ed., 1974) [hereinafter Wiison, Politics of Regulation]; Stewart, supra 
note 82, at 1684-86. 
This may be the result of various influences: {l) agencies' dependence on constituents for 
resources and cooperation, see FRANCIS E. RouRKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 11-24 {1969); WILSON, supra note 101, at 79-80; Stewart, supra note 82, at 1686; (2) 
the professional norms agencies share with their constituencies, see Suzanne Weaver, Anti­
trust Division of the Department of Justice, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 123, 150 (James 
Q. Wiison ed., 1980); (3) employment of former agency personnel - and the prospect of 
their future employment - by regulated entities, see Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug Adminis­
tration, in id., at 191, 212-13; Wiison, Politics of Regulation, supra note 102, at 159-60; or (4) 
simply frequent contact between agency personnel and representatives of the regulated com­
munity, see Quirk, supra, at 211. 
103. See EDWARDS, supra note 101, at 127-33 {discussing problems associated with agen­
cies' use of standard operating procedures); WILSON, supra note 101, at 101-09 (discussing 
the effects of agency "culture"). 
104. See WILSON, supra note 101, at 86-88 {discussing the effects of agency officials' "be­
liefs"); Steven Kelman, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, in THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATION, supra note 102, at 236, 250 (noting the important influence of agency officials' 
"values" and "ideology" on agency outputs). Of course legislators are also guided by their 
ideologies, but those ideologies are an element considered by voters in electing them. See 
BERNARD R. BERELSON ET AL., VoTING 309 {1954) {discussing voters' tendency to vote for a 
candidate because of the candidate's adherence to a party ideology). 
105. For discussion of capture of the legislative process, see generally THEODORE J. 
Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM {2d ed. 1979) and George J. Stigler, The Theory of Eco­
nomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 3 {1971). The influence of interest groups 
is plain on the face of some legislation. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 14, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-244, 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 11 (creating National Visiting Nurse Associations Week); Act 
of Oct. 13, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-116, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 696 (creating National 
Health Care Food Service Week); Act of May 22, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-31, 1989 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 63 (creating National Correctional Officers Week). 
106. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison); JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE 
INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 2-4 (1984). 
107. For examples of pluralist theory, see generally ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE To 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); 
cf. ALExis DE TocaUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA bk. II, chs. V-VII (Henry Reeve 
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achieve the pluralist ideal,108 in a contest with administrative agen­
cies, the legislature is better able to incorporate the will of the pub­
lic in identifying uses of private property that serve it. An agency's 
decisionmaking process - marshaling expertise to decide technical 
questions109 - is inadequate to determine which uses are "pub­
lic. "110 Given that courts consistently defer to agencies' decisions in 
their areas of expertise,111 one should not be surprised that they 
would defer to the legislature in its area of competence: determina­
tion of the public will and weal. 
3. The Judiciary 
The legislature's uniquely "public" character also means that 
courts should not allocate to themselves the power to define public 
uses. Although a plaintiff might ask the court to decide indepen­
dently whether an ultra vires action in fact comprehends a public 
purpose based on the particular situation before the court, courts 
should deny themselves the privilege of so defining public use be­
cause public purposes are not simply a matter of fact. To be sure, 
since Marbury v. Madisi:m, 112 the courts have generally occupied 
the seat of final arbiter of the Constitution's meaning,113 and there 
is some precedent to support such a role in giving content to the 
public use requirement.114 That approach, however, chafes against 
trans., Vmtage Books 1990) (1840) (discussing the plethora of interest groups spawned in 
American society as solution to the problem of the "majority's tyranny"). 
108. Many have criticized pluralist theorists' conclusion that societal interests can be ade­
quately represented through interest group competition for influence in the legislative pro­
cess. See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, PoLmcs AND MARKErs 141 (1977) (finding skewed 
representation of interests in institutional political processes); MANCUR OLSON, THE Lome 
OF CoLLECTIVE AcnoN 1-2, 125-31 (1971) (discussing impediments to formation of political 
pressure groups); KAY LEHMAN SCHLoZMAN & JoHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED !NTERESTS 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 66 (1986) (finding, based on empirical research, that "the 
Washington pressure community is not inclusive"). The argument made here, however, is 
not that interest groups represent perfectly the gamut of societal interests, but rather that any 
single interest will have more difficulty capturing the legislative process than its administra­
tive counterpart. 
109. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976) (noting that "issues re­
quir[ing] a high level of technical expertise [are] properly left to the informed discretion of 
the responsible federal agencies"), cited in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 
U.S. 360, 377 (1989). 
110. See sources cited supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
111. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687, 703, 708 
(1995); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 
(1984). 
112. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
113. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
114. See Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930) ("It is well established that in 
considering the . . .  expropriation of private property, the question what is a public use is a 
judicial one."); Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908). But see United 
States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946) (limiting Vester to cases 
involving "the power to condemn 'excess' property"); see also cases cited supra note 83. 
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both the contemporary understanding of the relative roles of the 
judiciary and legislature and the particular competence of the 
courts. 
The Supreme Court in this century has been particularly careful 
about substituting its own views of wise policy for those of legisla­
tures.115 For a court to decide what does and does not constitute a 
public purpose without according substantial deference to the legis­
lature's pronouncements or silence would fly in the face of the 
Court's contemporary approach to economic and social regulation 
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.116 The now 
well-established policy of judicial deference to legislative judgment 
reflects the view that the courts are not properly situated to substi­
tute their views for those of the legislature where broad judgments 
of the public interest are at stake. 
Interpretation of the public use requirement also strains the 
traditional area of judicial competence frequently cited as a justifi­
cation for judicial review. Unlike interpretation of law, ascertaining 
public purposes demands representative decisionmaking.117 As a 
result, although a court can review a legislature's judgment of pub­
lic purpose for its basic rationality,118 it cannot effectively deter­
mine such purposes without the legislature's guidance.119 Given the 
near impossibility of identifying objectively the "public interest," 
the judiciary - the least representative branch - is perhaps the 
least competent branch to determine independently which uses of 
private property benefit the public. A court simply does not pos-
115. By the middle of this century, the Supreme Court had largely abandoned its earlier 
insistence on second-guessing legislatures' regulation of economic activity. Compare, e.g., 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
116. See, e.g., Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731 (due process); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955) (equal protection); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 
(1937) (due process); see also TRIBE, supra note 47, § 8-7 {discussing the death of economic 
substantive due process); id. § 16-2 {discussing rational basis review under the Equal Protec­
tion Clause). The Takings Clause evinces no reason to show less deference to legislative 
judgment in its application than in applying the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 
117. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
118. Courts may reject a legislative determination of public use only where " 'it is shown 
to involve an impossibility,"' that is, where the " 'use [is] palpably without reasonable foun­
dation."' Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (quoting, respectively, 
Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) and United States v. Gettysburg 
Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)). This deferential standard of review approximates 
that applied to regulatory legislation under substantive due process. See Midkiff, 461 U.S. at 
242-43; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Merrill, supra note 75, at 63; Stoebuck, 
supra note 73, at 590. For a discussion of the similarity between the due process and public 
use standards, see infra section 11.C. 
119. That is, although the judiciary may veto a legislature's implicit or express finding of 
public purpose where utterly lacking in reasonable foundation, it may not identify which 
actions have such purposes where the legislature has not spoken to the question; a court may 
point to actions that lack public purposes but cannot identify actions that advance public 
purposes. 
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sess the representative procedural machinery necessary for making 
such decisions. 
The Supreme Court has affirmed this view and resoundingly 
held in cases such as Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing Author­
ity v. Midkiff that the judiciary is ill-suited to making determina­
tions of public use.12° The Court in those cases referred to 
prudential concerns about the propriety and ability of the judiciary 
to make the broad determinations of public policy that the public 
use requirement demands.121 The Court has repeatedly and plainly 
stated that the legislature, not the judiciary, is the proper expositor 
of public use. 
* * * 
Given that the legislature is the body properly vested with au­
thority to determine which actions will further a public use, it fol­
lows that agency actions without statutory bases cannot advance 
public uses. In general, regardless of the appearance of public pur­
pose to an outside observer such as a court, that observer simply 
cannot say that an action will advance a public use where the legis­
lature has not authorized the action and thus has not considered or 
addressed the question. In sum, ultra vires actions by definition 
cannot serve public uses. 
B. The Function of the Public Use Requirement 
In eminent domain, the public use requirement stands as a gate­
keeper, limiting the situations in which government may constitu­
tionally condemn property and disallowing the taking of private 
property for private, as opposed to public, uses.122 But how should 
the public use language function in inverse condemnation cases, 
where the property owner brings suit to recover just compensation 
for an ongoing or already completed action that the state denies 
constitutes a compensable taking? This section argues that even 
where a court deciding an inverse condemnation suit has found that 
agency action has "taken" property, if the taking does not advance 
a public use, just compensation need not be paid. As a result, ultra 
vires takings, which lack public purposes, cannot be compensable. 
120. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. 299; Berman, 348 U.S. 26; see also other sources cited supra 
note 83. 
121. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244 ("Judicial deference is required because, in our system 
of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be ad­
vanced by an exercise of the taking power."); Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
122. See, e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241, 245; Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry., 208 U.S. 
598, 605 (1908); see also Lawrence Berger, Public Use, Substantive Due Process and Takings 
- An Integration, 14 NEB. L. REv. 843, 846 (1995); Merrill, supra note 75, at 61; Rubenfeld, 
supra note 2, at 1079; Stoebuck, supra note 73, at 595. 
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The text of the Takings Clause makes clear that just compensa­
tion is not available where the action fails to advance a public use: 
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation."123 Each element of the Clause's text prior to the 
comma imposes a prerequisite to the requirement of compensation, 
following the comma: "private property" must have been "taken" 
and the taking must have been "for a public use." Indeed, in the 
seminal case of regulatory takings, Pennsylvania Coal Co. .v. 
Mahon, 124 Justice Holmes acknowledged the role of public use as a 
threshold requirement: "The protection of private property in the 
Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but 
provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensa­
tion."125 To apply the just compensation requirement to actions 
lacking a public purpose would effectively redact the public use re­
quirement from the Clause or would replace the phrase "for public 
use" with "for public or private use."126 This would fundamentally 
distort the meaning of the Takings Clause. 
Accordingly, several courts have expressly rejected claims for 
just compensation under the Takings Clause where the challenged 
action failed to advance a public use.127 Courts have considered the 
role of the public use requirement most frequently in cases of gov­
ernment officials' accidental or negligent damaging of private prop­
erty in the course of normal public duties.128 Several of these courts 
have held that the government actor's negligence eliminates the el­
ement of public use required by state and federal takings clauses 
thereby precluding compensation.129 Commentators on the Clause 
123. U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
124. 260 U.S. 393 {1922). 
125. 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added); see also United States v. North Am. Transp. & 
Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333 {1920); Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U.S. l, 7·8 {1885) (construing a 
similar provision in the Missouri Constitution); cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 511 {1987) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) ("[T]he existence of . • •  
a public purpose is . . •  a necessary prerequisite to the government's exercise of its taking 
power."). 
126. Cf. CoLO. CoNST. art. II, § 15 {"Private property shall not be taken . . •  for public or 
private use, without just compensation."). 
127. See, e.g., Cole, 113 U.S. at 8 (construing a similar provision in the Missouri Constitu­
tion); Worman v. United States, No. 95-5067, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27117, at *7 n.4 {Fed. 
Cir. Oct. 17, 1996); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lidsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 
990 {Cal. 1935); Forsyth County v. Greer, 439 S.E.2d 679, 681 {Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Clark v. 
Asheville Contracting Co., 342 S.E.2d 832, 838 (N.C. 1986). 
128. See, e.g., Lucien v. Johnson, 61 F.3d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1995); Miller v. City of Palo 
Alto, 280 P. 108, 109 {Cal. 1929); Bates v. Madison County 123 S.E. 158, 159 {Ga. Ct. App. 
1924); Angelle v. State, 34 So. 2d 321, 323 (La. 1948); Gearin v. Marion County, 223 P. 929, 
933 {Or. 1924); Lizza v. City of Uniontown, 28 A.2d 916, 919 (Pa. 1942); Texas Highway 
Dept. v. Weber, 219 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Tex. 1949); see also A.W. Gans, Annotation, Damage to 
Private Property Caused by Negligence of Governmental Agents as "Taking," "Damage," or 
"Use" for Public Purposes, in Constitutional Sense, 2 A.L.R. 2D 677 § 6 {1995). 
129. See, e.g., Lucien, 61 F.3d at 574-76 ("A complication is that almost certainly [plain­
tiff's] personal property was not taken for a public use.") (emphasis omitted); Angelle, 34 So. 
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and its state constitutional counterparts have agreed that the public 
use requirement limits the situations in which just compensation 
must be paid.13o 
Nevertheless, one might counter that allowing compensation for 
non-public use takings would not redact the public use requirement 
if it is read not as a threshold requirement of compensation, but 
instead as a basis for additional, injunctive relief. This argument 
might proceed as follows. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that under normal circumstances the Takings Clause does not pro­
vide injunctive relief.131 That is, a takings claimant cannot opt for 
injunction of the offending regulation in lieu of compensation. 
Where the challenged action lacks a public use, on the other hand, 
the action might not be allowed to stand: it is not "otherwise 
proper" as required by First English.132 Thus, the argument contin­
ues, a property owner may seek both just compensation for a regu­
lation alleged to be a taking and a court order enjoining the 
2d at 323-24 (finding no taking where "destruction or damage occurs not for a public purpose 
but by reason of the negligence of the state officers or agents"); Gearin, 223 P. at 933 (finding 
"no intention upon the part of the county to subject the property or any part thereof to a 
public use" where plaintiff's property was damaged by flooding accidentally caused by de­
fendant agency). 
130. See Jan G. Laitos, The Public Use Paradox and the Takings Clause, 13 J. ENERGY 
NAT. REsoURCES & ENVTL. L. 9, 11 (1993); Merrill, supra note 75, at 61 n.2; Rubenfeld, 
supra note 2, at 1120 (arguing that the public use requirement identifies "a specific category 
of constitutional takings - the category for which compensation would be required"); Arvo 
Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative 
Power, 19 STAN. L. REv. 727, 782 n.293 (1967) ("[T]he theory of inverse condemnation does 
not apply . . .  in a case where no public-use element is present.") (discussing California con­
stitutional provision). But see TRIBE, supra note 47, § 9-2, at 590-91 (arguing that the com­
pensation requirement itself has come to be the only assurance of public purpose provided by 
the Clause). 
131. "[The Takings Clause] is designed not to limit governmental interference with prop­
erty rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interfer­
ence amounting to a taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987); see also Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2157 
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127-28 (1985) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Mon­
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984)); Williamson County Regl. Planning Commn. v. Hamil­
ton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). 
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfe� the Court enjoined the application of the Coal Act, 26 
U.S.C. § 9701 (1994 and Supp. II 1996), as unconstitutionally retroactive. See 118 S. Ct. 2151-
53. In her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor relied on the Takings Clause to enjoin applica­
tion of the statute, apparently in contradiction of the cases cited supra. See 118 S. Ct. at 2153. 
In concurrence, Justice Kennedy found that the statute should be invalidated under the Due 
Process Clause, and he therefore dissented from the plurality's decision to apply the Takings 
Clause. See 118 S. Ct. at 2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in 
part). The four dissenting Justices, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, opposed 
invalidation altogether. See 118 S. Ct. at 2160-68. Although a bare majority rejected the 
Act's constitutionality, the proposition that the Act should be invalidated based on the Tak­
ings Clause did not receive support from a majority of the Court. 
132. 482 U.S. at 315. 
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regulation because it does not advance a public use.133 Once the 
plaintiff establishes that the action lacks a public use, the reviewing 
court might, on the authority of the public use requirement, enjoin 
further enforcement of the regulation. Then, the public use re­
quirement having been applied, the court could proceed to provide 
just compensation for the period the restriction was in effect.13 4 In 
short, this argument concludes that public use is not a "threshold" 
or "gatekeeper" requirement for just compensation, but rather a 
basis for additional, injunctive relief.135 
Neither courts nor commentators have conclusively determined 
whether the lack of a public purpose allows injunctive relief.136 
Some have suggested that the absence of a public purpose simply 
makes the Takings Clause altogether inapplicable, and therefore no 
relief of any kind can be predicated on the Takings Clause where 
the challenged action lacked a public purpose.137 Others have sug­
gested that the public use requirement demands that a reviewing 
court enjoin enforcement of a regulation lacking a public purpose, 
as it would when faced with a formal exercise of eminent domain.13s 
In any event, neither theory requires that the government pay 
just compensation for actions that lack public purposes. Under the 
first theory, the Takings Clause has no effect whatsoever and thus 
the just compensation requirement is not implicated.139 The action 
133. Such injunctive relief would be redundant in ultra vires takings cases specifically 
because a court will enjoin enforcement of an ultra vires regulation on administrative law 
grounds. See supra note 5. For other actions that lack public uses, however, this argument 
would give injured property owners an injunctive remedy they would otherwise lack due to 
the general rule against enjoining takings. 
134. This sounds distinctly like the situation in First English. See 482 U.S. 304. The dif· 
ference, of course, is that the Court in First English was not faced with a regulation that 
lacked a public use. See supra note 21. 
135. An alternative way of thinking about this view is that the terms "public use" and 
"just compensation" each create particular remedies: the former allows a claim for injunctive 
relief while the latter allows a claim for monetary relief. 
136. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(noting the lack of a conclusive answer to the question). 
137. See Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 464; Michael J. Davis & Robert L. Glicksman, To the 
Promised Land: A Century of Wandering and a Final Homeland for the Due Process and 
Taking Clauses, 68 OR. L. REv. 393, 443-44 & n.241 (1989); John A. Humbach, Constitutional 
Limits on the Power to Take Private Property: Public Purpose and Public Use, 66 On. L. REv. 
547, 554-55 (1987); Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 1120. 
138. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (dictum); F.E. 'frotter, 
Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1989); Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 464; cf. 2A 
Juuus L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.01[4] (rev. 3d ed., 1998). Injunction 
for an absence of public use would not be prohibited under the normal rule against injunctive 
relief under the Takings Clause, discussed supra note 131. First English only rejects injunc· 
tion of takings that are "otherwise proper," 482 U.S. at 315, which an action without a public 
purpose is arguably not. 
139. The effect of this view would be analogous to that of a finding that the property in 
question was not in fact "taken" or that the plaintiff's taken interest was not "private prop· 
erty"; in those cases the plaintiff simply could not look to the Takings Clause for relief. 
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might be invalidated as violating due process,140 but the Takings 
Clause will provide neither just compensation nor injunctive relief. 
The second theory also does not demand that the state pay just 
compensation, although the reason is more complex. The public 
use requirement must serve a function in both of the plaintiff's 
claims, for injunctive relief and for just compensation. While the 
plaintiff might cite the public use requirement as authority for en­
joining the regulation, she cannot then claim that the action did ad­
vance a public use to support her claim for just compensation for 
the duration of the regulation's effect. Consider the following illus­
tration. An agency has regulated plaintiff's property so as to elimi­
nate all economically beneficial use thereof. Plaintiff brings suit 
seeking injunction of the regulation and just compensation. Be­
cause an injunction is not normally available in inverse condemna­
tion, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's action lacked a public 
use and therefore should be enjoined. In a second count, plaintiff 
seeks just compensation for the taking of her property. If the court 
finds that the taking did indeed lack a public purpose, it might en­
join the regulation, converting a permanent taking into a temporary 
taking. The real question arises when the court considers the sec­
ond count: Should the court provide just compensation for the 
now-temporary taking? If yes, the court would be awarding com­
pensation for ''private property . . .  taken [without] a public use, 
without just compensation." This is plainly at odds with the text of 
the Takings Clause. While plaintiffs generally may plead inconsis­
tently141 - that a taking without public use or a taking with public 
use had occurred - such inconsistent pleading could not give the 
plaintiff both requested remedies. In sum, the public use require­
ment may provide an injunctive remedy, but only as an alternative 
to just compensation. 
Ultra vires actions do not advance public uses. The Takings 
Clause demands that an action serve a public use if that action is to 
give rise to a claim for just compensation. Therefore, ultra vires 
actions cannot give rise to claims for just compensation. 
C. Police Power Takings 
The Supreme Court's "police power takings" test,142 one prong 
of the regulatory takings test presented in Agins v. City of 
140. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 n.23 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 464. The due process violation might 
also, in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), allow monetary relief against the responsi­
ble officers. See infra section ill.B.1. 
141. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); MICH. CT. R. 2.lll(A)(2). 
142. See Laitos, supra note 130, at 13 (apparently coining the term "police power 
taking"). 
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Tiburon143 and reiterated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun­
cil, 144 does not defeat the argument that the public use requirement 
prevents payment of just compensation for ultra vires actions. In 
Agins, the Court stated that a regulation "effects a taking if [it] does 
not substantially advance legitimate state interests. "145 Some have 
suggested that this "test" squarely contradicts the Court's public 
use cases.146 Several compelling arguments suggest, however, that 
the police power test does not demand compensation for takings 
that lack public purposes, such as ultra vires takings. 
The Agins test ostensibly indicates that a regulatory action that 
is beyond the scope of the state's police power147 - that is, one that 
"does not substantially advance legitimate state interests"148 -
constitutes a taking. At the same time, however, the Supreme 
Court has held that the public use requirement of the Takings 
Clause is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police pow­
ers. "149 Thus where a state has acted outside its police power by 
failing to advance a legitimate state interest, its act cannot be said 
to advance a public use under the Takings Clause. Because of the 
near inverse relation of the Agins police power takings test to the 
143. 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980). 
144. 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
145. 447 U.S. at 260 (emphasis added). 
146. See generally Respondents' Answer to League for Coastal Protection, Planning and 
Conservation League, Etc. Amicus Brief at 6-7, Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commn., 
953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998) (No. S059847) (on file with author); Laitos, supra note 130. 
147. The "police power" is seemingly incapable of precise definition. At root it encom· 
passes the state's plenary power to regulate private conduct: "Public safety, public health, 
morality, peace and quiet, law and order - these are some of the more conspicuous exam­
ples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely 
illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 
(1954). "[1Jo be a valid exercise of the police power in the first instance a government regu­
lation must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Brendale v. Confederated 
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 429 n.11 (1989) (citing William· 
son v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)) (emphasis added). What falls within the 
police power is an open question that courts address on a case-by-case basis. See Stone v. 
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1880). 
The "legitimate state interest" formulation is substantially similar to the test traditionally 
applied to determine whether legislative action violates substantive due process. Cf. County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716 (1998) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 
331 (1986)) (noting that substantive due process protects against "the exercise of power with· 
out any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective"). In­
deed, the Agins Court cited Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 {1928), a substantive 
due process case, as primary authority for its test, and identified as a "seminal decision" 
another substantive due process case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See 
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61. For comparisons of the police power takings test to substantive 
due process, see Laitos, supra note 130, at 35; Thomas E. Roberts et al., Land-Use Litigation: 
Doctrinal Confusion Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 28 URB. LAW. 765, 766 
(1996); Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected Through the Takings Clause: 
Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 ENVTL. L. 155, 159 (1995). 
148. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). 
149. Hawaii Rous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 
32. 
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Court's und,erstanding of a violation of the public use requirement, 
the Court appears to have established contradictory requirements: 
an action that fails to advance a public use under Berman and 
Midkiff also must be compensated as a taking under Agins. 15o If 
this is correct, then this Note's contention that ultra vires actions 
lack public purposes would reinforce, not contradict, their compen­
sability under the Takings Clause. 
Consider the following illustration of the apparent similarity of 
the public use requirement and the police power test. A coastal­
zone regulatory agency adopts a regulation that requires a property 
owner to allow agency personnel to recreate on a portion of the 
owner's private dry-sand beach. A court might find, without en­
gendering much controversy, that such a regulation "fails to sub­
stantially advance legitimate state interests,'' and it therefore might 
hold that the regulation has effectively taken an easement in the 
plaintiff's property. The police power test would seem to allow the 
court to award compensation for the value of that easement. But 
the court might also readily hold that the regulation took property 
for the private use of agency personnel, as opposed to public use. 
On this basis, the court might enjoin enforcement of the regulation 
as lacking a public use,151 but the court could not award just com­
pensation.152 Characterized as a taking under the police power test, 
the action apparently demands compensation, but characterized as 
a violation of the public use requirement, the action demands, at 
most, an injunction. In other words, these two tests seem to create 
a "public use paradox. "153 Nonetheless, there is reason to believe 
that the rumors of such a paradox have been greatly exaggerated. 
150. See Laitos, supra note 130, at 14; Ross A. Macfarlane, Co=ent, Testing the Consti­
tutional Validity of Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative 
to Takings Analysis, 51 WASH. L. RE.v. 715, 730 (1982); cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 81, at 110 
(arguing that "[t]he Supreme Court has obliterated a key structural distinction" between the 
public use requirement and the police power test). 
151. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra section II.B. 
153. Laitos, supra note 130, at 9. 
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First, the statements in both Lucas and Agins were dicta154 and 
thus are not binding precedent.155 Indeed, both cases' discussions 
of the test are paradigmatic instances of the unreliability of dicta.156 
The Agins case neither cited a prior takings case for its proposi­
tion157 nor discussed the reasoning behind its statement.1ss The 
Lucas Court's discussion, while more lengthy, creates new confu­
sion. In Lucas, the Court ostensibly identifies two situations that 
constitute takings per se: actions that amount to physical invasions 
of property and actions that deprive property owners of all econom­
ically beneficial use of their properties.159 The Court, however, 
later identifies the police power test as identifying a third situation 
in which a regulation cannot be sustained without payment of com­
pensation.160 In so doing, the Court converts what was long consid­
ered to be a defense to a taking - a finding that the regulation 
prevented one landowner's "harming" another or the public gener­
allyI61 - into support for the police power test as an independent 
154. In neither case was the police power takings test essential, or in Lucas even useful, 
to the holding. Although Agins elaborated a two-prong takings test, the Court found that the 
defendant locality had a slew of defenses, one of which was that the challenged action sub­
stantially advanced a legitimate state interest. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 
260-63 (1980). Lucas provided a general discussion of takings principles, including the puta­
tive Agins test. The Court decided the matter, however, on the basis of Agins's second 
prong, elimination of economically viable use. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1016 {1992). 
As this Note goes to press, the Supreme Court is considering a case in which the Agins 
theory was presented. See Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 
1422 {9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1359 {1998). The position of the four dissenting 
Justices and Justice Kennedy's partial dissent in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, suggests that a 
majority of the Court might reject the Agins test when next faced with it. See 118 S. Ct. 2131, 
2157 {1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("[Agins] is in 
uneasy tension with our basic understanding of the Takings Clause, which has not been un­
derstood to be a substantive or absolute limit on the Government's power to act."); 118 S. Ct. 
at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.) (arguing that the 
Takings Clause is concerned with "providing compensation for legitimate government ac­
tion") (emphasis omitted). 
155. See, e.g., Humphrey's Exr. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626-27 (1935); Carroll v. 
Lessee of Carroll, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 275, 287 (1850); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF 
nm JUDICIAL PROCESS 29 {1921) ("[I]t is a good deal of mystery to me how judges • . .  should 
put their faith in dicta."). 
156. Dicta are generally thought to be unreliable for having had the benefit neither of full 
argument by the parties nor of full consideration by the court. In a classic statement, Chief 
Justice Marshall identified this as the reason for courts' refusal to accord precedential effect 
to dicta: "The question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in 
its full extent." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821). 
157. The Court cited only Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), a sub-
stantive due process case, for its statement. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
158. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
159. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
160. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026. 
161. The Court's numerous "noxious use" cases held that a takings claim would not lie 
where the challenged regulation prohibited a noxious or harmful use of property. See Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1026 n.13 (collecting cases). 
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basis of takings liability.162 The Court provides no discussion of 
what would advance such a legitimate state· interest, as it was not 
called to do so by the case before it. This confusion is precisely the 
problem raised by courts' ruminations on legal issues outside the 
ratio decidendi of the case. For this reason, courts should be wary 
of applying the police power test to award just compensation. 
Moreover, the Court's application of the police power test does 
not support payment of just compensation: the Court has never ap­
plied the test to make such an award.163 Instead, the Court has 
applied the test in Dolan v. City of Tigard164 and Nollan v. Califor­
nia Coastal Commission.165 only to enjoin conditions imposed on 
land development permits that lacked the necessary means-ends 
connection to a legitimate state interest. As a result, neither case 
can be authority for payment of just compensation. If anything, 
these cases indicate that the Agins test identifies one situation in 
which regulatory action is not "otherwise proper" - and thus is 
deserving of an injunction - unlike the situation in which compen­
sation must be paid.166 Such a view in fact puts the Agins test in the 
same role as that often attributed to the public use requirement, 
invalidation of offending regulations,167 not a "paradoxical" or con­
flicting role. 
Finally, the risk of creating a "public use paradox" mandates 
that courts not read Agins and its progeny expansively. The Court's 
well-established public use cases should not be trumped by a broad 
application of dicta that have never been applied to award just com­
pensation. Rather than force a conflict between the police power 
takings test and the public use doctrine - and add new confusion 
to an already muddled takings jurisprudence - courts should apply 
the textual requirement of public use and the Court's clearly­
established public use precedents as argued' supra in sections II.A 
and II.B. 
* * * 
162. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026. This notwithstanding the Court's use of language that 
suggests that substantial advancement of a legitimate state interest constitutes a defense to a 
takings challenge: "land use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advance[s] 
legitimate state interests." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original; 
emphasis added). 
163. Cf. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 390 (1988) ("[N]o court 
has ever found that a taking bas occurred solely because a legitimate state interest was not 
substantially advanced."). 
164. 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). 
165. 483 U.S. 825, 834, 836 (1987). 
166. See cases cited supra note 131 (discussing the general rule against enjoining actions 
that amount to takings). 
167. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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Lacking legislative benediction, ultra vires actions by definition 
do not advance public uses, which are creatures of legislative will. 
The police power takings test notwithstanding, courts have properly 
applied the public use requirement in its gatekeeping role to reject 
claims for just compensation leveled at administrative actions that 
do not serve a public purpose. These premises lead to the conclu­
sion that where a plaintiff demands just compensation for an ultra 
vires taking, the public use requirement must bar her claim. 
m. FAIRNESS & ALTERNATIVE LEGAL THE0R1ES 
This Note takes the intuitively perverse position that state gov­
ernments are protected from compensating property owners under 
the Takings Clause because their agencies acted without authority. 
But the ultra vires character of the action should not encourage us 
to provide a remedy under the Takings Clause where the terms of 
the Clause would not otherwise demand one. Despite our intuition 
to the contrary, the Takings Clause does not serve a punitive func­
tion; rather, it is designed to compensate claimants where govern­
mental entities have taken their property to serve the public.168 
Little can be gained by shoehorning into the Takings Clause a rem­
edy for every injury to private property rights perpetrated by a gov­
ernment official. That the challenged action lacked statutory 
authorization provides no additional reason to do so.169 This Part 
contends that the unauthorized aspect of ultra vires actions should 
not cause us to be willfully blind to the Clause's textual require­
ments. Section III.A argues that notions of "fairness" should not 
keep courts from applying the requirements of the Takings Clause 
as identified in Parts I and II. This section argues that although 
fairness is frequently cited as a basis of takings law, that notion is 
fundamentally reciprocal and thus is not implicated by ultra vires 
takings. Section III.B contends that due process, tort, or legislative 
remedies are more appropriate avenues by which property owners 
may seek remuneration. 
168. See Frrst English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 314-15 (citations omitted) ("[The Flfth Amendment] does not prohibit the taking of 
private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power . . • . [I]t is 
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to 
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking."). 
169. See Dalton v. Spector, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994) ("Our cases do not support the prop­
osition that every action by [an] executive official[ ] in excess of his statutory authority is ipso 
facto in violation of the Constitution."); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945) 
("Violation of local law does not necessarily mean that federal rights have been invaded."). 
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A. Fairness 
At its root, the Takings Clause's guarantee of just compensation 
embodies an intuition of fairness.17° The Supreme Court expressed 
that intuition in Armstrong v. United States171 and has affirmed its 
expression in numerous subsequent cases.172 In the Court's view, 
fairness demands that private property owners be compensated 
where they have been forced to bear public burdens beyond their 
pro rata share: "[The Takings Clause] bar[s] Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair­
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."173 To 
give effect to the Armstrong formulation, and to satisfy the ag­
grieved owner's - and our - intuitions of fairness, perhaps courts 
should read the Takings Clause with an eye for equity and grant 
property owners just compensation for ultra vires takings.174 Sev­
eral arguments, however, counsel against applying Armstrong and 
the intuition it reflects to grant relief under the Takings Clause in 
ultra vires cases. 
First, predictability and interpretive economy demand that the 
public use and state action requirements of the Takings Clause not 
be trumped by our intuition of fairness. The Takings Clause has 
presented one of the most prolonged and Byzantine problems of 
constitutional jurisprudence. For whatever reason, takings doctrine 
is notoriously convoluted and devoid of straightforward rules of ap­
plication.175 As a result, property owners - and arguably govern-
170. On the intuition of fairness generally, see JAMES Q. Wn.soN, THE MORAL SENSE 55-
78 (1993). 
171. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
172. See, e.g., First English, 482 U.S. at 318-19; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986, 1005 (1984); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978). 
For an extensive list of Supreme Court cases citing Armstrong, see Note, The Principle of 
Equality in Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1044 n.111 (1996). 
173. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (emphasis added). On fairness as the basis for just com­
pensation generally, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967). 
174. Indeed, a court might be justified in looking to equity for its decision, as the just 
compensation obligation has long been thought to rest on principles of equity. See, e.g., 2 
BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 73, at 221 (citing 2 GROTIUS, supra note 73, bk. II, ch. XIV, 
§ VII); 2 KENT, supra note 83, at 275-76; 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 73, at 1285-86. 
175. For an example of the Court's nebulous takings tests, see Penn Central Transporta­
tion Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (articulating a multi-factor, "essentially 
ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" to identify compensable takings). See also supra text accompanying 
notes 159-63 (describing the confusion created by the Court's opinion in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council). This confusion is reflected in the epithets that commentators 
have attached to takings law; indeed, that confusion seems to be the one aspect of takings law 
about which most commentators can agree. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 8 
("chaos"); Rose, supra note 2, at 561 ("muddle"); Sax, supra note 73, at 37 ("a welter of 
confusing and apparently incompatible results"). But see EPSTEIN, supra note 81, at 85 
("What constitutes a taking of private property is a question that admits to a rigid logical 
answer, so it is always possible to judge which judicial decisions are clearly right or clearly 
wrong."). 
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mental agencies themselves - cannot clearly understand the extent 
of their respective rights and responsibilities under the Clause.176 
To use a principle of "fairness" to trump the requirements of 
public use and state action is to exacerbate the existing convolu­
tions of takings jurisprudence. While Armstrong established an ar­
guably nebulous fairness principle to guide interpretation of the 
Takings Clause,177 that principle is fairly discernible in the Clause 
itself.178 To apply that principle where the express requirement of 
public use and the implicit requirement of state action are not met 
converts a broad but supportable principle into an uncabined and 
insupportable remedy at variance with the Clause and further mud­
dies the water of takings law. 
Second, the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Armstrong is 
based on circumstances not present in the case of an ultra vires tak­
ing. Armstrong, by its terms, demands compensation where govern­
ment forces property owners to bear more than their fair share of 
"public burdens."179 Actions that cannot be considered acts of the 
state or that violate the public use requirement do not impose pub­
lic burdens and thus are not compensable even under the language 
of Armstrong.180 If the action lacks a public purpose, a "public bur­
den" is absent a fortiori. Similarly, if the state action requirement is 
not met, the "burden" imposed may be that of the responsible of­
ficers in their individual capacities, but it is not that of the public 
principal. 
The principles underlying Armstrong confirm this view. 
Although the intuition that demands "compensation" is exception­
ally strong in ultra vires cases, the intuition of fairness offended by 
ultra vires takings is not that expressed in Armstrong. The intuition 
176. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2155 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment and dissenting in part) (noting the importance of interpreting the Takings 
Clause so as to "provide( ] some necessary predictability for governmental entities"). See 
also generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1697 (1988) {describing takings law's unsettling effect on private 
expectations). 
177. On the difficulties of basing takings judgments on the fairness criterion, see 
Michelman, supra note 173, at 1248-53. 
178. The Armstrong principle in effect reflects the idea of an "average reciprocity of ad­
vantage" noted by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 
(1922), which suggests that on the whole, government action implicitly compensates property 
owners for their contributions to the public weal, but that where property owners are called 
upon to contribute more than they receive, compensation should be paid. See also EPSTEIN, 
supra note 81, at 197 (citing Mahon and Armstrong); Michelman, supra note 173, at 1225. 
That is, Armstrong is a gloss on the meaning of "just compensation": it requires payment of 
compensation where property owners have not or will not be justly compensated from the 
public benefits produced by government's "use" of their properties. 
179. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (emphasis added). 
180. Cf. Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Armstrong's "fairness and justice" language to support statement that the Takings Clause 
"requires compensation when the government takes . . .  property for a public purpose"). 
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underlying Armstrong is that of "fairness as reciprocity,"181 the 
sense that "[y]ou should give benefits to those who give you bene­
fits . . . .  [It is a] generalized moral norm . . .  which defines certain 
actions and obligations . . .  toward others on the basis of their past 
behavior."182 Armstrong supports payment of just compensation -
a benefit - where the property owner's property has contributed 
to the public good - a benefit - and the owner has not been ade­
quately compensated by receiving her share of that public benefit. 
This reciprocal view of fairness vis-a-vis the public is not implicated 
where the public cannot be considered a party to the takings trans­
action, as where the agency official does not represent the state, or 
where the purpose of the action is not to benefit the public. 
Ultra vires takings are intuitively offensive, but for reasons 
other than the reason that proper but uncompensated takings are 
intuitively offensive. To stretch the Takings Clause to apply to such 
situations does damage to the integrity of the constitutional text 
and to established judicial interpretations of that text and creates 
further uncertainty for property owners and regulators. The intui­
tive - and justified - reaction to unauthorized agency action 
should not lead us to stretch the Takings Clause beyond its reason­
able meaning. 
B. Potential Alternative Remedies 
Although the Takings Clause does not provide a just compensa­
tion remedy for ultra vires actions, aggrieved property owners may 
look to other avenues for monetary relief. Although a complete 
assessment of alternative remedies is beyond the scope of this Note, 
due process and tort law seem to be appropriate places to look for 
such monetary relief. In the event that current law does not pro­
vide an adequate remedy, property owners may call upon their leg­
islatures for relief. 
1. Due Process and Section 1983 
The Due Process Clause has traditionally been considered a bul­
wark against arbitrary governmental action.183 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
provides a due process action for damages against the officers re­
sponsible for a deprivation of property and against municipalities 
181. WnsoN, supra note 171, at 65-69 (discussing "fairness as reciprocity" generally); see 
also supra note 178. 
182. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. 
Soc. REv. 161, 170 (1960) (emphases omitted). 
183. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716 (1998) (quoting 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 
(1986). 
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that employ them.184 Unlike a claim for just compensation, because 
section 1983 requires only that the officer have acted under color of 
authority, an agency action's lack of authority would not defeat the 
claim. The Due Process Clause remains, in conjunction with sec­
tion 1983, a potential legal theory for aggrieved property owners 
who are not satisfied with simple invalidation of the challenged ul­
tra vires action.185 
The Supreme Court has held, however, that only executive ac­
tion that "shocks the conscience" will violate substantive due pro­
cess.186 The Court has clarified that an agency will be considered to 
have acted to "shock the conscience" only where an agency has ac­
ted intentionally to harass and harm property owners.187 To be 
sure, many instances of ultra vires takings will be unintentional, the 
results of simple errors of statutory interpretation, 188 and thus non­
compensable under the Due Process Clause. On the other hand, in 
the most egregious cases, where officials have used the regulatory 
process intentionally and maliciously to delay and harass property 
owners, courts may award damages for section 1983 due process 
claims. 
Alternatively, because of the similarity of the standards of pub­
lic use and due process,189 a court might construe an ultra vires ac­
tion's lack of a public use to "dump the case into the due process 
clause."19° On this view, the public use requirement serves as a 
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 {1994); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 187-91 
{1961) (recognizing a private cause of action, but not against municipalities), overruled in part 
by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (recognizing an 
action against municipalities). Section 1983 does not, however, provide relief against states 
or state agencies directly. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 {1979). 
Relief under § 1983 might also be predicated on a theory that the agency action violates 
the Takings Clause because it lacks a public use. That is, a taking without public use may 
itself be a "deprivation of [a] right[ ], privilege[ ], or immunit[y]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; cf. supra 
section Il.B (discussing the function of the public use requirement and the possibility that it 
gives rise to a claim for injunctive relief). 
185. Several lower federal courts have suggested in dicta that due process may offer a 
remedy for ultra vires actions in some circumstances. See Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 
10 F.3d 796, 803 {Fed. Cir. 1993); Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. 574, 576 
(C.C.D.C. 1835) {No. 830); Marks v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 387, 410 {1995); Catellus Dev. 
Corp. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 399, 408 n.9 (1994). 
186. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1717 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 
(1952)). For application of the "shocks the conscience" standard of substantive due process 
to land use decisions, see, for example, PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31 {1st 
Cir. 1991), quoted in Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 1184-85 {1996). 
See also Stewart M. Wiener, Comment, Substantive Due Process in the Tlvilight Zone: Pro­
tecting Property Interests from Arbitrary Land Use Decisions, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1467, 1476-77 
{1996). 
187. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1718 {holding that "liability for negligently inflicted harm is 
categorically below the threshold of constitutional due process"). 
188. See, e.g., Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commn., 953 P.2d 1188 {Cal. 1998). 
189. See supra section II.C. 
190. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 {7th Cir. 1988). 
Although Lewis suggests that a substantive due process claim will lie only for executive ac-
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boundary line between actions remediable by just compensation 
under the Takings Clause and those that amount to "deprivations" 
that the Due Process Clause is intended to address. Justice 
Brennan took this position in his influential dissent in San Diego 
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego:191 
[W]here a police power regulation is not enacted in furtherance of the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare . . .  there may be no 
"public use." Although the government entity may not be, forced to 
pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, the landowner 
may nevertheless [allege] a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
violation.192 
That is, the facts that cause an agency action to violate the public 
use requirement may also be adequate to give rise to a substantive 
due process claim. Other jurists and commentators have also hy­
pothesized that such a connection between the public use require­
ment and due process exists,193 although the position has not been 
adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court. 
2. Tort Law 
While the reciprocal-fairness concern normally present in tak­
ings cases is absent in ultra vires cases, the "rogue" character of the 
tion that "shocks the conscience," the Court expressly distinguished executive and legislative 
action. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1716-17. As a result, where enactment of a regulation or 
ordinance is at issue, the agency's exercise of quasi-legislative power might bring the case out 
of the "shocks the conscience" standard. On agency action as "quasi-legislative," see S.E.C. 
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). See also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 
(1983) (citing Humphrey's Exr. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935)). But cf. Morrison 
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 n.28 (1988) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing purely execu­
tive and quasi-legislative functions). 
191. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent, joined 
by three Justices, would have carried the day had Justice Rehnquist not found the Court's 
Takings Clause ripeness doctrine to be dispositive. See 450 U.S. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring). Justice Brennan's prescience was confirmed by the First English Court's fre­
quent citation of his San Diego dissent. See Frrst English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315, 316 n.9, 318 {1987). 
192. 450 U.S. at 656 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
193. See Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 921 (Cal. 1995) (Kennard, J., 
concurring) ("When the government causes a deprivation of property but does not benefit 
from the deprivation by putting the property to use . . .  the protections of due process gener­
ally suffice to protect against excessive or erroneous deprivations of property . . . .  "); 
SACKMAN, supra note 138, § 7.03[10][b][ii]; Berger, supra note 122, at 883-84 ("Properly, due 
process analysis . . .  should decide the question of whether the government's imposition is 
legitimate and therefore whether it has the power to so act. This is the same kind of an issue 
as is addressed by the public use doctrine . . . .  " (emphasis omitted)); Patrick WISeman, When 
the End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Jurisprudrnce in a Legal System with 
Integrity, 63 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 433, 439 n.26 (1988) ("Government violates the due process 
clause by regulating without a public purpose; in that case, no taking has occurred regardless 
of the effect of the regulation on private property."); see also supra note 148 and accompany­
ing text; cf. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2157-58 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("[W]e should proceed first to general due process 
principles, reserving takings analysis for cases where the governmental action is otherwise 
permissible."). 
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ultra vires act certainly arouses moral indignation. Our intuition 
that an unauthorized taking, of all regulatory actions, especially re­
quires remuneration arguably stems from the sense that the prop­
erty owner has been "wronged" by the unlawful action. This sense 
of the "wrongfulness" of the ultra vires act, however, places that act 
within the ambit of tort law. Remedy for "wrongs" and "blamewor­
thy" or "culpable" action lies in tort.194 In fact, several courts have 
held that the Takings Clause does not provide relief for ultra vires 
actions, because they are not compensable takings, but torts.195 
Tort law's traditional recognition of negligently inflicted harm may 
make it an available remedy for actions that lack the intentional, 
conscience-shocking element requisite for relief under due process. 
States' tort liability generally is limited by the doctrine of sover­
eign immunity, but some state courts have nonetheless held that 
state instrumentalities are not immune from tort liability for ultra 
vires acts.196 These cases involve interpretation of state statutes 
providing exceptions to the common law doctrine of sovereign im­
munity, 197 and thus immunity in any given state would depend on 
the terms of its waiver-of-immunity statute. Similarly, some courts 
have held that officials themselves may lose their qualified immu­
nity from suit where they have acted ultra vires.198 As a result, in at 
least some states sovereign immunity would apparently not pre­
clude a state agency's tort liability for ultra vires actions. 
194. Tort law is almost universally defined as legal prevention or remediation of 
"wrongs." See, e.g., Van Camp v. McAfoos, 156 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Iowa 1968) ("Generally 
speaking, a tort is a wrong, and a tortious act is a wrongful act."); Churchill v. Howe, 152 
N.W. 989, 991 (Mich. 1915); McElroy v. Gaffney, 529 A.2d 889, 891 (N.H. 1987); BLACK'S 
LAw D1cnoNARY, supra note 4, at 1489 (defining "tort" as "[a] private or civil wrong or 
injury" and "tortious" as "[w]rongful"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAw OF TORTS § 1, at 2 (5th ed. 1984) (defining tort as "a civil wrong, other than breach 
of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages"). 
But see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (argu­
ing for a causation-, rather than culpability-, based standard of tort liability). 
195. See Mac'Avoy v. Smithsonian Inst., 757 F. Supp. 60, 70 (D.D.C. 1991); American 
Commerce Natl. Bank v. United States, 38 Fed. CL 271, 272-73 (1997); Adams v. United 
States, 20 CL Ct. 132, 137 {1990); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Board of Regents, 909 S.W.2d 540, 543 
(Tex. App. 1995). But see EPSTEIN, supra note 81, at 35-36 (suggesting that governmental 
interference with private property is a taking if it would be tortious where performed by a 
private entity). 
196. See, e.g., Herzig v. Horrigan, 644 A.2d 360, 362 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994); Tolbert v. 
Crisp County Power Commn., 338 S.E.2d 295, 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Coleman v. Kootsil­
las, 575 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Mich. 1998). States' immunity from suit in federal court under the 
Eleventh Amendment would of course remain intact. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
197. See, e.g., Alaska Tort Claims Act, ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 1997); Califor­
nia Tort Claims Act, CAL. Govr. CoDE § 810 (West 1996); MICH. COMP. LAws § 691.1401 
(1998); New Jersey Tort Claims Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-1 (West 1997). 
198. See, e.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 593 (4th Cir. 1997); Bowling v. Brown, 469 A.2d 
896, 903 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801, 808-09 (S.D. 1987); 
Camacho v. Samaniego, 954 S.W.2d 811, 822 (Tex. App. 1997). 
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3. Legislative Remedies 
If neither tort nor due process claims will lie under current law, 
state legislatures remain available to hear property owners' griev­
ances and to provide remedies. State legislatures have in recent 
years shown new solicitude for property owners' claims under the 
Takings Clause and have enacted statutes to provide compensation 
to property owners where state or local regulation reduces the 
value of property but does not rise to the level of a constitutional 
taking as defined by the courts.199 For example, Texas's Private 
Real Property Rights Preservation Act200 requires state agencies to 
prepare "takings impact assessments" to determine the effects of 
proposed government actions on private property and requires 
agencies and localities to pay compensation to property owners 
whose real property values are diminished by twenty-five percent 
or more.201 The Texas statute and those of its kind in other states at 
least suggest that some state legislatures may be open to legislation 
providing compensation for otherwise noncompensable ultra vires 
takings. Property owners might also lobby their state legislatures to 
change their states' tort claims statutes to waive sovereign immu­
nity for ultra vires actions or to enact private bills202 to provide re­
lief for individual property owners. 
In general, one might expect legislatures to be favorably dis­
posed to a property owner's complaint of an ultra vires taking, as 
the agency has violated legislative will in acting ultra vires. This is 
especially true in the cases that we should be most worried about, 
where evidence indicates that an agency has intentionally acted to 
harass a property owner. In such cases, in addition to the legislative 
remedies already mentioned, the legislature may rely on its usual 
mechanisms for sanctioning rogue agencies.203 
199. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 70.001 (Harrison Supp. 1997); IDAHO CoDE §§ 67-
8001 to 67-8004 (1995); LA. R:Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3602(11), 3:3610, 3:3622 (West Supp. 
1998); TEX. GoVT. CoDE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.024 (West 1997); see also generally Mark W. 
Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 187 (1997). 
200. TEX. GoVT. CoDE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.045. 
201. See TEX. GoVT. CoDE ANN. § 2007.043 (assessment); TEX. GoVT. CODE ANN. 
§ 2007.002(5)(B) (compensation). 
202. A private bill is legislation that "deals with individual matters [such as] claims 
against the government." JAY M. SHAFRITZ, THE HARPERCoUINs D1crrONARY OF 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 61-62 (1992). Some state constitutions, however, 
prohibit this sort of legislation. See WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FruCKEY, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PuBuc POLICY 
249 (2d ed. 1995). 
203. Cf. generally JOSEPH P. HARrus, CoNGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 
(1964) (discussing the federal legislature's tools for controlling executive agencies, including 
investigation, control of appropriations, and the legislative veto). These sanctions admittedly 
would not provide the property owner any compensation, but would deter similar agency 
behavior in the future. · 
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* * * 
Both concerns of interpretive economy and the intuition of fair­
ness expressed in the Takings Clause and in judicial interpretations 
of the Clause in the end point away from the Takings Clause's just 
compensation remedy for ultra vires actions. Tort law, the constitu­
tional requirement of due process, or new legislation may present 
more appropriate alternatives. To be sure, plaintiffs face road­
blocks under any of those approaches, but establishing a just com­
pensation remedy under the Takings Clause is not worth the 
damage done to the language and purposes of the Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
Two independent arguments, rooted in the text of the Takings 
Clause, support rejecting claims for just compensation leveled at 
state ultra vires actions. The Takings Clause's state action require­
ment, in league with principles from the law of agency, suggests that 
ultra vires actions cannot be compensable under the Takings 
Clause; where government agents act without authority, their acts 
are their own and not those of the state. The Supreme Court has 
applied such a theory to claims brought against the federal govern­
ment. Because the Court's theory is equally applicable to state gov­
ernments, the Supreme Court cases and the agency principles they 
reflect should be read to preclude just compensation for ultra vires 
takings claims at the state �evel as well. 
The public use requirement of the Takings Clause demands that 
all compensable actions serve a public purpose. Such a purpose 
must be identified in the first instance by the legislature or by an 
agency to whom the job has been delegated expressly or by implica­
tion. Where a regulatory action lacks legislative authorization, the 
legislature cannot be said to have approved the action's purpose as 
public. As a result, the public use requirement prohibits payment 
of just compensation for unauthorized actions. 
Many may complain that the rule elaborated in this Note is un­
fair and point out that fairness has long been a lodestar of takings 
law. In fact, courts have relied on fairness to identify which actions 
can be said to rise to the level of a "taking" and assumed require­
ments of the Takings Clause are met. Where those requirements 
are not met, however, unfairness of the result should not dissuade 
courts from refusing relief under the Takings Clause. Claimants 
might instead look to other potential bases for relief, such as the 
Due Process Clause, the common law of tort, or even new legisla­
tion. Relief from those sources is admittedly uncertain, but that 
should not lead courts to reject an "otherwise proper" interpreta­
tion of the Takings Clause. 
